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Abstract 
The	growing	proportion	of	UK	bank	lending	to	the	financial	sector	reached	a	peak	in	2007	just	before	the	
onset	of	the	Global	Financial	Crisis	(GFC).		This	marks	a	trend	in	the	dwindling	amount	of	bank	lending	to	
private	 sector	 non-financial	 corporations	 (PNFCs),	 which	 was	 exacerbated	 with	 the	 Great	 Recession.	
Many	 central	 banks	 aimed	 to	 revive	 bank	 lending	 with	 quantitative	 easing	 (QE)	 and	 unconventional	
monetary	policy.	 	 	We	propose	an	agent	based	computational	economics	(ACE)	model	which	combines	
the	main	factors	in	the	economic	environment	of	QE	and	Basel	regulatory	framework	to	analyse	why	UK	
banks	 do	 not	 prioritize	 lending	 to	 non-financial	 businesses.	 The	 lower	 bond	 yields	 caused	 by	 QE	
encourage	 big	 firms	 to	 substitute	 away	 from	 bank	 borrowing	 to	 bond	 issuance.	 In	 addition,	 the	 risk	
weight	 regime	of	Basel	 I/II	on	capital	 induces	banks	 to	 favour	mortgages	over	business	 loans	 to	 small	
and	 medium	 enterprises	 (SMEs).	 The	 combination	 of	 lower	 bond	 yields	 and	 Basel	 II/III	 capital	
requirements	on	banks,	which,	respectively,	impact	demand	and	supply	of	credit	in	the	UK,	plays	a	role	
in	 the	 drop	 of	 bank	 loans	 to	 businesses.	 	 The	 ACE	model	 aims	 to	 reinstate	 policy	 regimes	 that	 form	
constraints	 and	 incentives	 for	 the	 behaviour	 of	 market	 participants	 to	 provide	 the	 causal	 factors	 in	
observed	macro-economic	phenomena.		
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1. Introduction 
The	great	financial	crisis	(GFC)	of	2007	produced	severe	recessions	in	major	economies	and	raised	the	
threat	 of	 a	 total	 collapse	 of	 the	 global	 financial	 system.	 The	 crisis	 had	major	 repercussions	 for	 the	 UK	
economy	that	witnessed	an	increase	in	unemployment	and	severe	contraction	in	GDP	BoE	by	about	4.7%	
in	 the	 last	 3	 quarters	 of	 2008.Like	 the	 monetary	 authorities	 of	 other	 countries,	 the	 Bank	 of	 England	
(BoE)reduced	 its	 short-term	policy	 rate	 to	exceptionally	 low	 levels	 from	5.75%	 to	0.5%,	over	 the	period	
from	 July	2007	 to	March	2009.	However,	 lowering	 interest	 rates	proved	not	 to	be	 sufficient	 to	 support	
aggregate	 demand	 and	 help	 in	 the	 economic	 recovery	 to	 pre-crisis	 levels.	 Consequently,	 following	 the	
precedent	first	set	by	the	Bank	of	Japan	in	2001,	and	more	recently	by	the	US	Federal	Reserve	(Fed)	Large	
Scale	 Asset	 Purchase	 (LSAPs)	 programs	 of	November	 2008,	 the	 BoE	Monetary	 Policy	 Committee	 (MPC)	
launched	an	open-ended	asset	purchase	program	(APP)	in	March	2009.		Unlike	conventional	open	market	
operations	 involving	 short	 term	assets,	 central	banks	make	outright	purchases	of	 longer	 term	securities	
(see,	Haldane	et	al,	 2016)	under	 these	asset	purchase	programs,	also	 referred	 to	as	quantitative	easing	
(QE).	
As	the	APP	was	to	be	subsumed	under	the	1997	Monetary	Policy	Framework,	priority	was	given	to	
the	 necessity	 of	 “increasing	 nominal	 spending	 growth	 to	 a	 rate	 consistent	 with	meeting	 the	 inflation	
target	 in	the	medium	term”4.In	addition,	the	MPC	minutes	of	March	5	2009	note	that	APP	“would	also	
mean	 that	 the	banking	 system	would	be	holding	a	 higher	 level	 of	 reserves	 in	 aggregate,	which	might	
cause	it	to	increase	its	lending	to	companies	and	households”.	At	the	same	time,	it	was	also	anticipated	
by	the	MPC	that	APP	will	enhance	“functioning	of	corporate	credit	markets,	that	should	make	it	easier	
for	some	types	of	companies	to	raise	finance,	reducing	their	reliance	on	the	banking	sector”	(Ibid.)	The	
mechanics	 of	QE	 aimed	 at	 asset	 purchases	 from	non-bank	 financial	 institutions	 involves	 new	electronic	
central	bank	money	credited	to	the	reserve	account	of	the	seller’s	bank	which,	in	turn,	creates	a	deposit	of	
the	same	amount	favouring	the	seller.	This,	so	called	bank	lending	channel,	which	is	now	replete	with	bank	
reserves,	is	expected	to	increase	bank	lending	to	households	and	businesses5.	To	what	extent	were	these	
anticipated	outcomes	of	QE	borne	out?	
																																								 																				
4This	is	reported	in	the	letter	from	the	Chancellor	of	the	Exchequer	of	3	March	2009	and	also	in	the	MPC	minutes	of	March	5		
2009(http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20091204142322/http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/d/chxletter_boe050309.pdf,andhttp://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/minutes/Documents/mpc/pdf/200
9/mpc0903.pdf). The	 assets	 purchases	 are	 also	 seen	 to	 be	 critical	 to	 the	 strategy	 “to	 ease	 the	 flow	 of	 corporate	 credit…	
increase	 liquidity	and	trading	activity	 in	some	UK	financial	markets	and	stimulate	 issuance	by	corporate	borrowers	and	the	
resumption	of	capital	market	flows”	(Ibid). 
5Regarding	the	targeting	of	non-bank	financial	institutions,	especially	Insurance	Companies	and	Pension	Funds,	see	point	42	in	
the	minutes	of	the	MPC	meeting	for	the	4	and	5	March	2009	available	
at:http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/minutes/Documents/mpc/pdf/2009/mpc0903.pdf 
3	
	
0% 
5% 
10% 
15% 
20% 
25% 
30% 
35% 
40% 
45% 
Loans	to	HHs Loans	to	NFC Loans	to	RoW
Loans	to	OFIs Loans	to	INSs
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1,400
Loans	to	HHs Loans	to	NFC
Loans	to	RoW Loans	to	OFIs
Loans	to	INSs Total	Bank	Lending
Figure	1:	UK	Bank	Lending	to	Different	Sectors	2006	to	2014	(Quarterly;	£Billion,	RHS,	Totals)	
(a)	Amounts	Bank	Lending	(£Billion)		 	 (b)	Proportions	of	Total	Lending	 	
Source:	UK	ONS	Flow	of	Funds	Project:	Financial	Accounts	Excel	Sheet	3.2	
Notes:	 UK	 Bank	 lending	 refers	 to	 lending	 by	Monetary	 and	 Financial	 Institution;	 RoW:	 Rest	 of	World;	 HHs:	 Households;	 PNFCs:	 Private	 non-
Financial	Corporates;	OFIs:	other	financial	institutions;	INSs:	insurance	companies	and	pension	funds.	
As	shown	in	Figure	1:	UK	Bank	Lending	to	Different	Sectors	2006	to	2014	(Quarterly;	£Billion,	RHS,	
Totals),	UK	total	bank	lending	which	saw	an	average	growth	of	5.5%	per	quarter	between	2007	Q1	and	
2008Q1,	 with	 the	 latter	 standing	 at	 £3.61	 Trillion,	 suffered	 falls	 in	 the	 4%-6%	 range	 in	 the	 period	
between	2008Q2-2009Q2.	 	Within	a	 year	 from	 the	 start	of	 the	APP,	 total	bank	 lending	 jumped	7%	 in	
2010Q1	 and	 the	 lending	 to	 households	 and	 private	 non-financial	 corporates	 (PNFCs)	 peaked	 at	 £1.74	
Trillion.	However,	over	 the	next	3	years,	 total	bank	 lending	 fell	by	1%-3%	annually.	 It	 showed	a	 fall	or	
little	to	no	growth	in	every	quarter	except	for	2013	Q1,	probably	because	of	funding	for	lending	scheme	
(FLS)	(Churm	et.	al	(	2013),	Badeley-Chappell	(2013)).		It	should	be	noted	that	when	bank	lending	to	rest	
of	 the	world	 (ROW)	 is	 accounted	 for,	 domestic	 lending	 fell	 by	 over	 £200	 billion.	 Further,	 lending	 has	
been	found	to	be	skewed	in	the	direction	of	mortgage	lending	to	households	with	its	share	of	total	bank	
lending	 rising	 from	 25.69%	 in	 2009Q1	 to	 38.18%	 by	 the	 end	 of	 2014.	 	 In	 contrast,	 non-financial	
businesses	(non-financial	corporations	and	SMEs)	faced	a	fall	in	bank	loans	with	their	share	of	total	bank	
lending	falling	from	15.91%	to	12.16%	over	the	same	period.	We	also	examine	the	extent	to	which	non-
financial	 firms	 substituted	 away	 from	 bank	 loans	 to	 bond	 issuance	 through	 the	 portfolio	 rebalancing	
channel.		
A	 number	 of	 studies	 investigate	 how	 QE	 policy	 influences	 the	 real	 economy	 through	 the	 portfolio	
rebalancing	and	other	channels.	Gagnon	et	al.	(2010)	emphasize	the	impact	of	the	Fed	LSAPs	programs	on	
the	 yields	 of	 the	 longer-term	 assets	 purchased	 under	 the	 programs.	 They	 point	 out	 that	 the	 programs	
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appear	 to	 be	 successful	 in	 decreasing	 the	 term	 premiums	 by	 30	 to	 100	 basis	 points.	 More	
comprehensively,		Joyce	et.	al.	(2011)	specify	five	transmission	channels	of	the	impact	of	QE.	This	includes	
policy	signalling,	portfolio	rebalancing,	liquidity,	broad	money,	and	confidence.	They	claim	that	while	the	
effects	of	QE	can	spread	directly	into	the	wider	economy	through	the	confidence	factor	leading	to	larger	
aggregate	 expenditure,	 asset	 prices	 and	 returns	 represent	 the	 path	 of	 transmission	 for	 the	 other	 four	
channels.	 By	 lowering	 asset	 yields,	 QE	 can	 boost	 aggregate	 spending	 through	 decreasing	 the	 cost	 of	
borrowing	 for	 firms	 and	 consumers,	 Joyce	 et.	 al.	 (2011).Joyce	 et.	 al.	 (2014)	 have	 also	 investigated	 the	
specific	mechanics	 of	 portfolio	 rebalancing	 by	 the	non-bank	 financial	 institutional	 investors	 such	 as	 Life	
Insurance	 and	 Pension	 Funds	 which	 substituted	 the	 assets	 purchased	 by	 the	 BoE	 by	 bonds	 issued	 by	
PNFCs.	 	Equities	price	growth	caused	by	a	combination	of	portfolio	rebalancing	and	falling	 interest	rates	
also	boosts	the	value	of	legacy	assets	held	by	financial	institutions,	a	phenomenon	that	is	referred	to	as	
“stealth	recapitalization”	(see,	Brunnermeier	and	Sannikov	(2012)	and	Chodorow-Reich	(2014))	that	can	
help	 banksto	 remain	 buoyant.	 Hence,	 whatever	 the	 controversy	 surrounding	 the	 accumulation	 of	
‘excess’	 reserves	 at	 the	 central	 bank	 from	APP	 (see,	Reis,	 2016)6,	 and	 concerns	about	 such	extremely	
loose	monetary	 policy	 conditions	 for	 a	 prolonged	 period(see,	 Rajan	 (2010),	 Bean	 et.al.	 (2015))	 in	 the	
post	 GFC	 period,	 this	 paper	 investigates	 a	 specific	 misdirection	 of	 bank	 lending	 away	 from	 the	 real	
economy	in	the	context	of	QE.		
Thus,	while	Office	for	National	Statistics	(ONS)	data	in	Figure	1:	UK	Bank	Lending	to	Different	Sectors	
2006	to	2014	(Quarterly;	£Billion,	RHS,	Totals)	shows	that	domestic	lending	by	UK	banks	fell	by	more	than	
£218.6	billion	in	four	years	after	APP	was	introduced	early	in	2009,	the	worrying	trend	is	the	shrinkage	in	
the	amount	of	loans	to	UK	nonfinancial	businesses	falling	to	as	low	as	12%	of	total	lending	when	compared	
to	 a	 50%	 share	 of	 financial	 companies	 and	 rest	 of	 the	 world.	 	 The	 latter	 two	 was	 as	 high	 as	 59%	 in	
2008Q1.Indeed,	this	is	part	of	a	bigger	problem	of	“why	banks	do	not	lend	to	the	real	economy”.		This	has	
being	discussed	by	several	authors	under	the	rubric	of	excessive	growth	of	the	financial	sector	in	advanced	
economies	and	,in	particular,	growing	bank	activities	relating	to	trading	assets	and	financialization7as	these	
have	a	bearing	on	low	GDP	growth	and	its	extreme	volatility	(Blundell-Wignall,Roulet	(2013),Bezemer	and	
Hudson	(	2016),	Cecchetti	et	al	(2011),	Arcand	et.	al.	(2011),Stockhammer	(2004),			Easterly	et.	al	(2000)).	
The	 latter	 study	 by	 Stiglitz	 and	 his	 co-authors	was	 one	of	 the	 first	 to	 signal	 the	 negative	 impact	 of	 the	
																																								 																				
6Between	March	2009	and	August	2012,	the	total	amount	of	bank	reserves	on	the	liabilities	side	of	the	BoE	increased	from	about	£31.5	billion	to	
£251.9	billion.	This	increase	in	bank	reserves	at	the	BoE	accounts	for	about	59%	the	size	of	APP	by	the	end	of	2012.	The	same	phenomena	of	
increasing	bank	reserves	at	the	central	bank	appears	in	the	US	where	the	reserve	balances	with	Federal	Reserve	expanded	massively	after	the	
launch	 of	 large	 scale	 asset	 purchase	 (LSAP)	 programs	 in	 2008.	 The	 Fed	 data	 shows	 that	 bank	 reveres	 expanded	by	 about	 812%	between	
October	2008	and	August	2012.	(Source:	Data	Download	Program	(DPD):http://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/). 
	
7Partnoy	and	Eisinger	(2013)	analyse	the	financial	statements	of	big	banks	and	find	that	the	majority	of	their	income	and	also	outsized	losses	come	
from	traded	assets.		
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excessive	 growth	 of	 the	 financial	 sector.	 Though	 related,	 the	 focus	 of	 our	 analysis	 is	 not	 on	 this	wider	
problem,	which	also	relates	to	banks’	chase	for	yield	and	carry	trades	associated	with	cross-border	bank	
lending	triggered	by	prolonged	low	interest	rates.		Instead,	this	paper	aims	to	reinstate	at	a	micro-level	the	
role	 of	 financial	 regulation	which	 Stiglitz	 (2011)	 raised	 as	 an	 urgent	 issue	 for	 incorporation	 into	macro-
economic	models	to	test	out	systemic	and	systematic	impacts	from	the	incentives	and	constraints	inherent	
to	regulation.8	
While	the	fall	in	bank	lending	during	recessions	has	a	long	legacy,	including	the	theories	on	liquidity	
trap	where	close	to	zero	interest	rates	cannot	stimulate	investment	(for	example	Krugman	et	al.	(1998)	
and	Krugman	 (2000)),	 a	 relatively	new	strand	of	 literature	on	 the	 impact	on	bank	 lending	 from	capital	
adequacy	requirements	has	evolved	since	the	1990s.	The	diverse	justifications	for	the	decreases	in	bank	
lending	during	recessions	 in	the	presence	of	capital	adequacy	requirements	have	been	based	either	on	
the	lower	supply	of	credit	by	banks	or	the	lack	of	demand	for	loans.	The	supply-side	explanations	can	be	
grouped	into	two	main	categories.	Studiesin	the	first	category	(such	as	Thakor	(1996),	and	Borio	and	Zhu	
(2012))	 attribute	 the	decrease	 in	bank	 lending	 to	 the	 changes	 in	 the	 risk	perception	of	 the	banks.	 The	
other	 category	of	explanations	 (for	example,	Watanabe	 (2007),Repullo	and	Suarez	 (2013),	 and	Repullo	
(2013))	refers	to	the	shortage	of	bank	capital	(the	capital	crunch	hypothesis)	as	the	main	driver	of	credit	
rationing	in	the	downturn	especially	in	the	presence	of	pro-cyclical	capital	regulations	(see	Brunnermeier	
et	al.	(2009)).9Further,	the	seminal	work	of	Jones	(2010)	implicates	banks’	regulatory	capital	arbitrage	for	
prompting	 an	 individually	 rational	 but	 destabilizing	 and	 socially	 deleterious	 response	 to	 Basel	 capital	
requirements	 for	 which	 Jones	 claims	 econometric	 models	 may	 not	 be	 best	 suited	 to	 analyse.	 	 The	
perverse	 incentives	of	Basel	 II	has	been	implicated	for	the	 large	 increase	 in	 leverage	in	banks	with	the	
use	of	credit	default	swaps	(CDS)	in	addition	to	mortgage	securities	on	bank	balance	sheets		(Blundell-	
Wignall-Smith	and	Roullet	(2013)	and	Markose	et.	al.	(2012))	 	and	of	sovereign	debt	 	to	reduce	capital	
from	 the	 implied	 risk	weighting,	 respectively,	 in	 the	 carry	 trades	 associated	with	 the	 GFC	 and	 in	 the	
Eurozone	 crisis	 (	Acharya	and	Steffan	 (2014)).	 	 Following	 the	 Jones	 (2020)	precedent,	we	argue	
that	 an	 agent	 based	 model	 of	 bank	 lending	 is	 needed	 to	 show	 how	 the	 constraints	 and	
																																								 																				
8Stiglitz	(2011),	in	the	context	of	fixing	macroeconomics	in	the	post	GFC	era,	had	noted	that	certain	‘perverse’	incentive	structures	especially	in	
the	 financial	 sector	were	 instrumental	 for	 the	destabilizing	events	of	 the	GFC.	 	 Stiglitz	 (ibid)	 concludes	 that	 ..	 “the	 standard	macroeconomic	
models	neither	incorporated	them	nor	provided	an	explanation	for	why	such	incentive	structures	would	become	prevalent—and	these	failures	
are	failures	of	economic	science.”	
9The	reliance	of	capital	regulations	on	the	mark-to-market	valuations	of	assets	and	the	market-based	measures	of	risk	makes	these	regulations	
pro-cyclical	and	 increases	the	volatility	 in	asset	markets.	That	 is,	 the	rises	 in	market	value	of	equity	during	booms	accompanied	with	fixed	
costs	of	bank	regulations	induce	banks	to	expand	their	lending.	In	contrast,	during	busts	equity	prices	become	low	decreasing	the	ability	of	
banks	to	provide	loans.	For	a	further	discussion	of	the	pro-cyclicality	of	bank	regulations	see	Brunnermeier	et	al.	(2009).	
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incentives	of	the	risk	weighted	capital	requirements	of	Basel	II	and	III	have	a	direct	bearing	on	
the	direction	of	the	bank	lending,	favouring	mortgages	and	penalizing,	in	particular,	SMEs.			
In	summary,	our	agent	based	model	brings	together	the	supply	and	demand		sides	of	bank	lending	in	
granular	detail.	On	the	demand	side,	the	influence	of	APP	on	gilts	and	corporate	bonds	yields	represents	
the	starting	point	of	our	ACE	model.	Asset	purchases	by	BoE	reduce	the	supply	of	gilts	remaining	for	the	
private	 sector	 (local	 supply	effects)	 leading	 to	 lower	 yields	on	gilts	 and	 corporate	bonds	 (McLaren	et	 al	
(2014)).	The	lower	bond	yields	 induce	BFs	to	substitute	parts	of	their	bank	borrowing	with	security	debt	
(bonds).	On	the	supply	side,	influenced	by	the	capital	requirements,	that	assign	different	risk	weights	for	
different	types	of	 loans,	banks	respond	to	the	drop	in	big	firms	borrowing,	by	expanding	mortgages	and	
decreasing	the	amount	of	loans	granted	to	SMEs,	which	carry	a	higher	risk	weight.	The	mortgage	market	
of	 UK	 households	 is	 also	 modelled	 in	 detail.	 The	 distinction	 between	 big	 firms	 (BFs)	 and	 small	 and	
medium	 enterprises	 (SMEs)	 is	 important	 in	 the	 context	 of	 this	 paper	 because	 the	 accessibility	 to	 debt	
financing	is	different	for	the	two	types	of	firms.	BFs	have	access	to	security	debt	(bond)	market,	whereas	
borrowing	from	banks	represents	the	sole	source	of	debt	financing	for	SMEs.	In	the	standard	perspective	
of	the	fall	 in	the	demand	for	loans,	for	instance,	Bikker	and	Hu	(2012)	argue	that	the	lack	of	demand	for	
bank	loans	rather	than	supply	is	the	key	factor	in	the	fall	in	bank	borrowing	during	slumps.10	However,	in	
this	context,	little	consideration	has	been	given	to	the	impact	of	lower	bond	yields	(and	hence	the	wider	
use	of	security	debt)	which	is	caused	by	QE,	on	the	demand	for	bank	loans	by	big	nonfinancial	firms.	This	
represents	a	vital	element	in	our	explanation	of	the	fall	of	bank	lending	to	nonfinancial	businesses.	
Methodologically,	we		propose	a	data	driven	formulation	of	the	ACE		model	of	the	developments	in	
the	UK	bank	lending	markets	since	APP	was	introduced	along	with	the	regulatory	capital	constraints	on	
banks.	 The	 ACE	model	 of	 the	 paper	 follows	 the	 data	 driven	 approach	 described	 in	Markose	 (2013)	 in	
requiring	 that	 the	 distributional	 characteristics	 of	 the	 different	 economic	 sectors,	 such	 as	 households,	
nonfinancial	 businesses	 and	 banks,	 are	 based	 on	 empirical	 foundations.	 We	 implement	 an	 important		
empirically	 determined	 scale	 factor	 to	 specify	 the	 numbers	 of	 agents	 in	 each	 class	 in	 order	 that	 they	
represent	the	UK	economy.		This	also	permits	the	outputs	of	the	ACE	model	to	be	scaled	back	up	to	give	
simulated	results	 that	can	be	validated	against	actual	UK	data.	 	We	use	Windrum,	Fagiolo	and	Moneta	
(2007)	method	for	model	validation.	
The	relevant	balance	sheet	items	of	each	of	the	10	biggest	UK	banks	is	part	of	the	initial	conditions	for	
the	simulation	of	UK	bank	lending	decisions	for	mortgages	and	to	SMEs.		The	use	of	micro-level	data	sets	
is	similar	to	the	BoE	agent	based	model	of	the	UK	mortgage	market	,	Baptista	et.	al	(2016)	in	that	granular	
																																								 																				
10	See	also,	Berger	and	Udell	(1994).	
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institutional	 	 details	 and	data	 are	 included	 to	 investigate	 implications	of	 specific	macro-policy	 relevant	
measures	 that	 can	alter	behaviours	of	market	participants	 	by	using	 the	 simulation	model	 for	 scenario	
analysis	and	comparative	statics.	However,	while	the	BoE	ACE	focussed	on	the	buy	to	let	rental	market,	
we	 consider	 a	 wider	 loan	 portfolio	 decision	 model	 of	 UK	 banks.The	 important	 difference	 in	 banks’	
behaviour	with	the	 introduction	of	Basel	capital	constraints	 in	their	portfolio	allocation	decision,	comes	
about	 only	 when	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 direct	 costs	 of	 the	 credit	 risk	 of	 default	 on	 loans,	 	 the	 different	
categories	of	bank	loans	invites	an	institutionalized	cost	of	capital	implied	by	the	Basel	risk	weighted	rule.	
We	use	extant	average	bank	write	offs	on	the	categories	of	loans	to	proxy	for	the	probability	of	default	in	
all	the	scenarios.	The	simple	8%	capital	ratio	of	Basel	I,	results	in	exactly	the	same	optimal	lending	policy		
for	 households	 as	 in	 the	 case	 of	 no	 regulatory	 capital	 requirements	with	 the	 former	 only	 implying	 an	
overall	upper	limit	on	leverage	for	the	total	loan	book	without	distinction	between	the	asset	classes.		In	
contrast,	one	of	the	main	findings	is	that	what	was	a	less	than	rigid	preference	among	banks	in	favour	of	
mortgages	 and	 against	 loans	 to	 businesses,	 especially	 SMEs,	 has	 become	 a	 veritable	 mecca	 of	 what	
Schularick	et.	al	(2014)		have	called	‘mortgaging	up’	after	the	introduction	of	favourable	risk	weights	on	
mortgages	 in	 Basel	 II.	 Ofcourse,	 there	 has	 not	 been	 the	 aggressive	 capital	 arbitrage	 by	 banks	 either	
through	 remote	 or	 synthetic	 securitization	 (see,	 Blundell-Wignall-Smith	 and	 Poulet	 (2013))	 in	 the	 post	
2009	period	of	APP.	Our	results	are	consistent	with	the	empirical	findings	that	during	the	course	of	APP,	
the	assumption	that	banks	extended	mortgages	only	in	response	to	the	slack	caused	by	big	firms	reducing	
bank	 loans	 as	 bond	 yields	 fell,	 is	 a	 good	 one.	 	 However,	 the	 growth	 of	 UK	mortgage	 lending	was	 not	
sufficient	 to	 counter	 the	 decline	 in	 business	 loans	 ,	 therefore	 representing	 the	 main	 cause	 of	 the	
shrinkage	in	total	bank	lending.	It	is	envisaged	that	the	data	driven	agent	based	model	of	the	UK	banking	
sector	 will	 be	 extended	 in	 a	 modular	 fashion	 to	 encompass	 a	 more	 explicit	 characterization	 of	 the	
Brunnermeir	and	Sannikov	(2012)	stealth	recapitalization	of	banks	in	 low	interest	rate	regimes	and	also	
the	 search	 for	 yield	 carry	 trade	 financing	 by	 UK	 banks	 to	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 world.	 	 Ideally,	 a	 fuller	
incorporation	is	needed	for	big	PNFC	behaviours	regarding	their	option	to	use	funds	from	bond	issuance	
to	buy	back	shares.		As	explained	in	the	literature	survey,	though	not	fully	exploited	yet,	ACE	models	can	
implement	 the	 endogenous/exogenous	 demarcation	 better	 than	 other	modelling	 techniques	 with	 the	
modeller	creating	exogenous	data	feeds	into	the	model	agents	in	a	time	specific	way.		
The	 reminder	 of	 the	 paper	 is	 structured	 as	 follows.	 Section	 2	 surveys	 the	 relevant	 literature.	 The	
agent-based	 approach	 used	 in	 the	 paper	 is	 outlined	 in	 Section	 3	 along	with	 a	 full	 description	 of	 the	
model	agents	and	their	behaviours.	Section	4	summarizes	the	ACE	model	initial	conditions	followed	by	
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the	 simulation	 outcomes	 and	model	 validation	 results.	 Section	 5	 contains	 concluding	 remarks	 of	 the	
paper.	
	
2. The Related Literature 
This	 literature	 survey	 is	 divided	 into	 three	 subsections.	 The	 first	 gives	 a	 brief	 survey	 of	 the	 QE	
literature	 including	 that	 related	 to	 the	 Japanese	QE	 introduced	 in	 2001.	 The	 second	 section	 examines	
some	of	 the	main	papers	 in	 the	 field	of	 the	 impact	of	 capital	adequacy	 requirements	on	bank	 lending,	
especially,	in	recessions.	In	the	last	section,	the	literature	of	agent-based	computational	macroeconomics	
(ACME)	is	reviewed.	
2.1 The Impact of Quantitative Easing on Bank Lending 
Quantitative	easing	 (QE)	 has	been	 stimulating	 the	academic	 literature	 since	 its	 introduction	by	 the	
Bank	of	Japan	(BoJ)	in	2001,in	particular	post	GFC	when	the	monetary	authorities	of	the	US,	UK	and	EU	
started	to	pursue	unconventional	monetary	policies.	The	main	studies	on	QE	focused	on	the	influence	of	
the	massive	asset	purchases	on	asset	 yields	 and	 less	 so	on	 the	macroeconomic	 consequences	and	 the	
impact	 on	bank	 lending.	 First,	while	 authors	 agree	 that	 asset	 purchases	 under	QE	have	decreased	 the	
yields	of	government	bonds	(Kimura	and	Small	(2004)	for	Japan,	D’Amico	and	King	(2011)	for	the	US,	and	
Daines,	Joyce	and	Tong	(2012)	for	the	UK),	the	evidence	on	the	impact	on	other	assets	yields	has	been	
mixed.	 Kimura	 and	 Small	 (2004)	 point	 out	 that	 BoJ	 asset	 purchases	 led	 to	 lower	 premiums	on	higher	
grade	 corporate	 bonds.	 This	 conclusion	 is	 supported	 by	 McLaren	 et	 al	 (2014)	 who	 argue	 that	 asset	
purchases	under	APP	reduced	gilts	yield	and,	through	local	supply	effects	(asset	purchases	by	BoE	reduce	
the	supply	of	gilts	 remaining	 for	 the	private	sector),	 the	yields	of	corporate	bonds.	They	claim	that	 the	
expected	 asset	 purchases	 had	 a	 significant	 impact	 on	 yields	 after	 each	 announcement	 in	March	 2009,	
August	2009,	and	February	2012.	Similar	 results	 for	Fed’s	LSAP	programs	are	revealed	by	Gagnon	et	al.	
(2010).	They	show	that	the	programs	led	to	dropsof	30	to	100	basis	points	in	the	risk	premium	component	
(rather	than	expectation	component)	of	 the	 longer-term	yields.	Conversely,	Oda	and	Ueda	 (2005)	show	
that	 the	 BoJ	monetary	 policy	 at	 close	 to	 zero	 interest	 rate	was	 effective	 in	 lowering	 the	 expectations	
component	of	interest	rates.	However,	the	portfolio	rebalancing	effects	on	the	risk	premium	component	
were	 not	 significant.	 The	 papers	 that	 analyse	 the	 effects	 on	 the	 wider	 economy	 generally	 specify	 a	
positive	 influence	of	QE	on	 the	 real	 economy.	 For	 instance,	Honda,	 Kuroki,	 and	 Tachibana	 (2007)	 and	
Harada	and	Masujima	(2009)	indicate	that	BoJ	QE	increased	aggregate	output	through	asset	prices	and	
bank	reserves.	This	conclusion	is	supported	by	the	results	for	US	QE	(Chen,	Cúrdia,	and	Ferrero	(2011)	
and	Baumeister	and	Benati	 (2010))	and	UK	QE	 (Kapetanios	et	al.	 (2012)).	 Lastly,	 the	 response	of	bank	
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lending	 to	 QE	 program	 has	 received	 relatively	 lower	 attention.	 For	 example,	 Bowman	 et	 al	 (2011)	
identify	a	positive	but	 small	 impact	of	BoJ	QE	on	bank	 lending.	 Joyce	and	Spaltro	 (2014)	 show	similar	
outcomes	for	the	BoE	APP	program.	They	claim	that	the	effects	were	more	important	for	smaller	banks.	
2.2 Bank Lending and Capital Adequacy Requirements 
The	 influence	 of	 capital	 requirements	 on	 bank	 lending	 and	 bank	 behaviour	 has	 been	 investigated	
since	 the	 introduction	of	Basel	 rules	 in	 the	 late	1980s.	Thakor	 (1996)	 inspects	 the	 role	played	by	Basel	
capital	 rules	 in	 the	 developments	 in	 the	 US	 banking	 system	 in	 the	 early	 1990s	 including	 the	 fall	 in	
aggregate	 bank	 lending	 and	 the	 increase	 in	 the	 share	 of	 government	 debt	 securities	 holding	 in	 the	
portfolios	 of	 US	 banks.	 He	 indicates	 that	 an	 expansionary	 monetary	 policy	 in	 the	 presence	 of	 capital	
requirements	may	either	 increase	or	decrease	bank	 lending	depending	on	the	 impact	of	 the	 increasing	
money	 supply	 on	 the	 term	 structure	 of	 the	 interest	 rates.	 	 Hans	 et	 al.	 (1999)	 point	 out	 that	 weakly	
capitalized	 banks	 tend	 to	 substitute	 away	 from	 assets	 with	 higher	 risk	 weights	 and	 to	 cut	 their	 total	
lending	 to	 enhance	 their	 capital	 ratios.	 These	 findings	 are	 supported	 by	 several	 authors11	 including	
Gambacorta	and	Marques-Ibanez	 (2011)	who	specify	 that	banks	with	weaker	capital	 ratios	and	greater	
dependence	on	market	funding	and	non-interest	income	sources	strongly	decreased	their	lending	during	
the	crisis.	Moreover,	Heid,	Porath	and	Stolz	(2004)	results	show	that	a	fall	in	capital	buffers	induces	banks	
to	rebuild	them	by	raising	capital	and	lowering	risk-weighted	assets	by	investing	more	in	the	safer	assets	
and	less	of	the	riskier	assets.	However,	although	most	of	the	literature	focuses	on	the	role	of	the	supply	
of	credit,	some	studies	attribute	the	decreases	 in	bank	 lending	 in	recessions	to	demand	factors.	Berger	
and	Udell	(1994)	investigate	the	causes	of	the	reallocation	of	credit	by	U.S.	commercial	banks	from	loans	
to	securities	in	the	early	1990s.	Their	results	indicate	that	while	risk-related	credit	crunch	hypotheses	are	
not	salient	reasons	of	the	fall	 in	bank	 lending,	demand-side	 impact	on	 lending	tend	to	be	strong.	More	
recently,	 Bikker	 and	 Hu	 (2012)	 argue	 that	 credit	 rationing	 in	 a	 cyclical	 downturn	 is	 not	 driven	 by	 a	
shortage	 in	 bank	 capital	 as	 the	 capital	 crunch	 hypothesis	 suggests.	 They	 show	 that	while	 the	 demand	
factors	dominate	the	market,	the	preeminent	loans	supply	variables	(bank	capital	and	reserves)	tend	to	
be	insignificant	determinants	of	bank	lending.	
As	many	of	 these	papers	rely	on	econometric	analysis,	conclusions	such	as	weakly	capitalized	firms	
switch	 to	 lower	 risk	 weighted	 assets	 is	 highlighted	 as	 an	 individually	 rational	 thing	 to	 reduce	 capital	
requirements,	 few	 papers	 take	 this	 forward	 as	 part	 of	 the	 macro-economic	 framework.	 Despite	 an	
influential	survey	of	Furfine	et.al	(1999)	that	asked	hard	questions	regarding	whether	the	Basel	regulatory	
framework	 led	 to	 systematic	 trends	 in	 bank	 lending	 and	 in	 particular	 the	 role	 of	 perverse	 incentives	
																																								 																				
11For	example,	Gambacorta	and	Mistrulli	(2004),	Rime	(2001),	and	Furfine	(2000). 
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flagged	out	in	detail	in	Jones	(2010)	in	the	form	of	capital	arbitrage,	few	macroeconomic	models	aim	to	
include	 the	 incentives	and	constraints	posed	by	Basel	 rules	 for	 the	macroscopic	 implications	of	 this	 for		
the	wider	problem	that	banks	are	lending	less	and	less	to	non-financial	corporations,	especially	to	SMEs.	
As	 noted	 in	 the	 introduction,	 this	 paper	 follows	 this	 route.	 	 In	Markose	 et.	 al.	 (2012),an	 agent	 based	
model	similar	in	the	data	driven	formulation	of	the	model	in	this	paper,	found	that	the	big	US	banks	were	
involved	in	a	CDS	carry	trade	in	the	run	up	to	the	2007	GFC,	but	without	the	favourable	20%	risk	weights	
from	synthetic	securitization	that	permitted	banks	to	reduce	capital	from	8%	on	bank	assets	to	1.2%	with	
the	 adoption	 of	 credit	 risk	 transfer	 by	 holding	 of	 CDS	 from	 AAA	 guarantors	 (like	 AIG),	 the	 observed	
extremely	high	levels	of	leverage	on	balance	sheets	of	US	FDIC	big	banks	could	not	have	been	achieved.		
Likewise,	 Acharya	 and	 Steffan	 (2013)	 gives	 the	 following	 analysis	 for	 the	 Eurozone	 crisis	 as	 a	 case	 of	
regulatory	capital	arbitrage	due	to	Basel	II	regulations,	which	assign	a	zero-risk	weight	for	investments	in	
sovereign	 debt.	They	 argue	 that	 governments	 themselves	 could	 have	 had	 incentives	 to	 preserve	 the	
zero-risk	weight	 in	order	 to	 increase	demand	 for	high	 risk	 sovereign	debt.	Acharya	and	Steffan	 (2013)	
state	 that	 “Undercapitalized	 banks,	 that	 is,	 banks	 with	 low	 Tier	 1	 capital	 ratios,	 have	 incentives	 to	
increase	short-term	return	on	equity	by	shifting	their	portfolios	into	the	highest-yielding	assets	with	the	
lowest	 risk	 weights	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	 meet	 regulatory	 capital	 requirements	 without	 having	 to	 issue	
economic	 capital	 (regulatory	 capital	 arbitrage)”.	 	 As	 will	 be	 pointed	 out	 in	 the	 next	 section,	 an	 ACE	
model	is	well	placed	to	test	out	perverse	incentives	that	lead	to	destabilizing	effects	of	policy.	
2.3 Agent-Based Computational (ACE)Macroeconomics 
The	study	of	 the	economy	by	means	of	ACME	and	network	analysis	 is	a	 relatively	new	field.	 It	also	
represents	a	suitable	approach	to	respond	to	the	criticisms	of	the	generic	representative	agent	model	of	
mainstream	macroeconomic	models12.	Macroeconomists	have	been	accused	of	a	heavy	dependence	on	
dynamic	stochastic	general	equilibrium	(DSGE)	models	that	are	built	around	special	cases	where	market	
inefficiencies	are	not	possible	 (Stiglitz	 (2011))	 and	 institutional	details	 and	 financial	 interconnections	 in	
the	 provision	 of	 liquidity,	 capital	 adequacy,	 	 solvency	 	 and	 contagion	 based	 negative	 externalities	 are	
ignored	 (Markose	 (2013)).	 Critics	 of	 the	 standard	 macro	 models	 have	 targeted	 the	 assumption	 of	
equilibrium	that	nets	out	all	private	credit	and	simply	cannot	 incorporate	herd	behaviour	and	network	
effects	 ,	 Akerloff	 (2002),	 and	 also	 carry	 trades	 from	 perverse	 incentives	 that	 result	 in	 destabilising		
phenomena	in	the	real	world,	Colander	et.	al	(	2009).	
																																								 																				
12Delli	Gatti	et.	al.	(2008,2010),Arthur	(2006),	Buiter	(2009)Wieland	(2010),	Stiglitz	(2011),	Kirman	(	2006,	2010	),	
Collander	et.	al		(	2009),among	others.	
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For	 our	 purposes	 existing	 ACME	 models	 can	 be	 classified	 into	 two	 main	 categories:	 those	 that	
produce	qualitative	results	and	those	that	are	data	driven.	The	bulk	of	the	ACME	are	qualitative	models	in	
which	stylized	boom	bust	dynamics	are	produced.		This	can	be	done	by	relaxing	rational	expectations	and	
using	adaptive	learning	or	explicit	herding	behaviours	(	see	Gaffeo	et.	al.	2008).		Lengnick	(2011)	gives	a	
simple	baseline	model.	For	a	recent	survey	of	the	ACEME	is	given	in	Dawid	and	Delli	Gati	(2018).		In	the	
second	category	of	ACME	we	have	those	purported	to	represent	massive	real	economy	models.	Models	
such	as	EURACE	and	ASPEN	projects	(Chan	and	Stiglitz	(2008))attempt	to	simulate	the	entire	EU	and	US	
economies,	respectively.	These	models	have	been	used	to	investigate	the	impact	of	policy	interventions	
in	 the	 US	 and	 the	 Euro	 Area.	 For	 example,	 Teglio,	 Raberto	 and	 Cincotti	 (2013)	 use	 the	 EURACE	
environment	to	assess	the	impact	of	capital	adequacy	requirements	on	the	wider	economy.	They	perform	
simulations	over	a	40-year	period	and	examine	the	short,	medium	and	long	run	implications	of	different	
levels	 of	 capital	 adequacy	 ratios.	 Their	 results	 show	 a	 non-trivial	 impact	 of	 capital	 adequacy	 ratios	 on	
GDP,	 the	 unemployment	 rate	 and	 the	 aggregate	 capital	 stock	 on	 banks.	 They	 also	 point	 out	 that	 this	
influence	of	the	capital	adequacy	ratios	arises	from	the	credit	channel,	and	varies	significantly	depending	
on	the	time	span	of	the	evaluation	period.		
									The	subset	of	the	data	based	ACE	and	the	most	recent	category,including	the	model	of	this	paper,	
follow	the	data	driven	approach	suggested	by	Markose	(2013)	and	it	is	closest	in	spirit	to	the	BoE	agent	
based	model	 for	 the	UK	mortgage	market	of	Battista	et.	al	 (2016).The	specificity	of	 institutional	details	
and	 policy	 conditions	 are	 finely	 modelled	 to	 analyze	 the	 responses	 of	 the	 relevant	 economic	 agents.		
Micro	 level	 data	 sets	 for	 the	 economy	 are	 used	 to	 calibrate	 the	 model	 agents	 and	 flow	 of	 funds	
constraints	are	strictly	adhered	to.	In	other	words,	the	endogenous/exogenous	demarcation	can	be	made	
in	ACE	models	with	the	relevant	exogenous	actual	data	that	be	specified	as	a	‘data	agent’	that	feeds	into	
or	informs	the	model	agents	in	ways	specified	by	the	modeller.		In	Markose	et.	al		(2012),	the	ACE	model	
was	used	to	see	the	consequences	of	the	credit	risk	transfer	rule	in	Basel	II	that	gave	a	20%	risk	weight	
to	bank	assets	that	had	AAA	guarantors	providing	CDS	cover.	It	is	argued	that	rule	following	behaviour	
as	in	complying	with	the	regulation	and	availing	of	the	full	extent	of	its	incentives,	and	also	the	conduct	
of	 carry	 trade	 activities	 are	 relatively	 easy	 to	 implement	 in	 ACE.	 This	 is	 because	 unlike	 fully	 fledged	
adaptive	behaviour,	agents’	strategies,	 intelligence	and	autonomy	are	limited	to	following	the	letter	of	
the	law	and	strictly	verifying	conditions	for	which	the	most	profitable	arbitrage	applies	and	also	tracking	
the	resulting	self-reflexive	deterioration	of	the	risk	in	bank	assets	as	agents	herd	into	them.	Stress	tests	
for	perverse	incentives	of	policy	are	among	the	easiest	of	multi-agent	exercises	and	as	with	it	must	be	
de	rigueur	in	macro-prudential	policy	in	order	that	flawed	policies	do	not	get	perpetuated.	
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3. Methodology of Data Driven Agent-based Model of UK Bank Lending 
3.1	Data	Characteristics	of	Agents		
We	model	the	developments	in	bank	lending	in	the	UK	after	the	introduction	of	APP	in	2009	using	an	
ABM	 with	 four	 classes	 of	 agents:	 households	 (HHs),	 big	 firms	 (BFs),	 small	 and	 medium	 enterprises	
(SMEs)	and	banks	(Bs)).	The	UK	economy	data	for	each	of	these	classes	of	agents	around	the	launch	of	
APP	in	2009,	given	in	Appendix	A,	is	used	as	empirical	basis	of	theinitial	conditions	both	for	the	numbers	
of	agents	in	each	class	and	also	for	relevant	balance	sheet	data	of	agents	for	the	ACE	model.The	latter	is	
purported	to	simulate	agents’interactions	in	the	UK	bank	lending	markets	on	a	monthly	basis	for	a	period	
of	50	months	from	the	advent	of	the	BoE	APP	in	2009.	
Our	 approach	 can	 be	 divided	 into	 five	 main	 steps.	 	 Firstly,	 our	 data	 driven	 ACE	 methodology	 	 is	
innovative		in	proposing	a	scale	factor	for	the	ABM	and	the	real	economy.		The	size	of	agent	classes	is	set	
in	a	way	that	replicates	the	actual	sizes	of	agent	populations	in	the	UK	based	on	data	from	the	ONS,	BoE	
financial	 statistics,	 Nationwide,	 and	 The	Money	 Charity	 around	 the	 launch	 of	 APP	 in	March	 2009.	We	
implement	 a	 proportional	 scaling	 factor	 calculated	 using	 the	 actual	 sizes	 of	 the	 UK	 households	 and	
nonfinancial	business	populations	as	follows.	The	number	of	households	with	at	least	one	adult	working	
in	2009	was	21.46	million13.	Additionally,	there	were	4.923	million	businesses	99.9%	(i.e.	4.918	million)	of	
which	were	SMEs14	and	the	remaining	 (i.e.	0.005	million)	were	BFs.	This	 indicates	proportions	of	0.229	
and	0.00024	between	the	number	of	SMEs	and	BFs,	respectively,	and	the	number	of	HHs.	Hence,	since	
the	number	of	HHs	in	the	ABM		is	set	to	100,000,	the	numbers	of	SMEs	and	BFs	will	be	set	to	22,900	and	
24	 respectively.	 	 As	 for	 banks,	 the	10	 largest	UK	banks	 that	 account	 for	 over	 87%	of	 bank	 lending	 are	
used.	 	Distributionally,	 the	 incomes	of	 the	10,000	HHs	 in	 the	ABM	are	set	 to	 represent	 the	UK	 income	
distribution	for	2009,	given	in	section	A.1	of	Appendix	A.		This	is	needed	for	the	purpose	of	modelling	HHs	
mortgage	 affordability	 used	by	banks	 as	 a	 lending	 criterion.	Additionally,	ONS	data	 indicates	 that	 cash	
holdings	of	households	represented	about	14.43%	of	their	total	assets	at	the	end	of	2008.15	
Second,	each	agent	is	given	a	balance	sheet	representing	its	initial	conditions.	The	value	assigned	to	
each	 item	 in	 an	 agent’s	 balance	 sheet	 is	 drawn	 from	 a	 distribution	 that	 replicates	 the	 empirical	
distribution.	For	example,	the	values	of	household	housing	wealth	are	set	to	reflect	the	fact	that	only	64%	
of	 UK	 households	 are	 homeowners	 in	 2009	 Q1.In	 the	 case	 of	 banks,	 the	 exact	 relevant	 items	 of	 the	
																																								 																				
13	In	2009,	there	were	25.83	million	households	16.9%	of	them	were	without	work	(i.e.	with	no	adult	working).	The	model	assumes	that	only	
households	with	a	working	adultis	eligible	for	obtaining	mortgages	to	buy	houses.		
14Small	and	Medium	Enterprise	Statistics	 for	 the	UK	and	Regions;	Enterprise	Directorate;	The	Department	 for	Business,	 Innovation	and	Skills	
(BIS);	Available	at:http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110920151722/http:/stats.bis.gov.uk/ed/sme/index.htm	
15	This	is	calculated	by	dividing	the	sum	of	households’	currency	and	deposits	(£1,172.470	billion)	on	the	sum	of	households’	financial	liabilities	
and	net	worth	at	the	end	of	2008	(1,550.126	billion	and	£6,573.639	billion	respectively).	
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balance	 sheets	 of	 the	 10	 largest	UK	 banks	 in	 2009	 (see	Appendix	A.4)	 are	 used.	 In	 the	 third	 step,	 the	
behavioural	 rules	of	 the	agents	are	defined.	 	This	constitutes	 the	main	engine	of	 the	ABM.	These	rules	
describe	the	responses	of	the	agents	to	different	developments.	For	instance,	a	big	firm	would	respond	to	
a	fall	in	the	cost	of	bonds	issuance	by	replacing	part	of	its	bank	loans	with	bonds.	Then,	in	the	fourth	step	
of	the	process,	the	simulation	is	run	under	three	different	scenarios	for	bank	behaviour	to	investigate	the	
role	 played	 by	 Basel	 capital	 adequacy	 rules.	 At	 the	 end	 of	 this	 stage,	 the	 values	 of	 bank	 lending	
aggregates	to	households	and	nonfinancial	businesses	are	simulated	for	each	of	the	50	months.	Finally,	
the	 simulated	 bank	 lending	 aggregates	 are	 rescaled	 up	 and	 compared	 to	 the	 actual	 UK	 bank	 lending	
aggregates	for	purposes	of	model	validation.	
3.2 The ACE Model 
The	model	of	 this	 paper	outlined	 in	Figure	2	 has	 an	 the	endogenous	 segment	 (the	dashed	area	 in	
Error!	Reference	source	not	found.)	which	is	embedded	within	the	wider	economy	where	the	relevant	
variables	relating	to	the	central	bank	,	 	 labour	market,	goods	and	services	market,	housing	market,	and	
capital	 markets	 are	 taken	 to	 be	 exogenous.	 	 The	 non-bank	 agents	 within	 the	 endogenous	 dashed	
segment	 are	 assigned	 to	banks	 and	 they	make	 their	 decisions	 specifically	 to	do	with	 their	 interactions	
with	banking	system	whilst	responding	to	the	exogenously	given	data	from	outside	the	dashed	segment	
in	Figure	2.	 	HHs	and	businesses	deposit	cash	 in	 their	assigned	banks.	HHs	and	businesses	also	seek	to	
obtain	 mortgages	 and	 bank	 loans,	 respectively,	 as	 conditions	 permit	 from	 their	 assigned	 banks.	 This	
implies	 that	 the	 assets	 and	 liabilities	 in	 the	 balance	 sheet	 of	 any	 bank	 are	 the	 horizontal	 sums	 of	 the	
corresponding	assets	and	liabilities	in	the	balance	sheets	of	the	agents	who	are	assigned	to	this	bank.	For	
example,	the	amount	of	deposits	on	the	liabilities	side	of	a	bank’s	balance	sheet	is	the	sum	of	the	cash	
deposits	of	all	HHs,	BFs,	and	SMEs	who	are	the	customers	of	this	bank.	
Nonfinancial	 firms	 (BFs	 and	 SMEs)	 employ	 physical	 capital	 and	 cash	 to	 operate	 and	 finance	 their	
operations	using	a	mixture	of	debt	financing	and	equity.	The	amount	of	physical	capital	(and	total	assets)	
defines	the	firm’s	size	which,	 in	turn,	determines	its	accessibility	to	different	debt	markets.	While	SMEs	
are	 restricted	 to	bank	borrowing,	BFs	can	also	 issue	debt	 securities	 to	 raise	debt	 financing.	Banks	hold	
cash	(accept	deposits)	of	HHs,	BFs	and	SMEs,	and	provide	loans	in	the	form	of	mortgages	to	households	
and	business	loans	to	BFs	and	SMEs.	A	further	description	of	the	initial	conditions	of	the	agents	and	the	
behaviour	of	these	agents	over	the	simulation	period	will	be	presented	in	the	next	sections.	
3.2 Agents’ Behaviours 
This	section	will	set	out	the	responses	of	the	model	agents	to	the	developments	in	their	surrounding	
environment	and	the	subsequent	interactions	of	one	another	within	the	endogenous	segment	of	Figure	
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2.	 According	 to	 Daines,	 Joyce	 and	 Tong	 (2012),	 the	 first	 round	 of	 BoE	 purchases	 caused	 a	 100	 basis	
points	 fall	 in	gilts	yields.	Hence,	 the	 impact	of	BoE’s	APP	 is	 introduced	 into	the	model	by	allowing	gilts	
rate	to	decrease	by	2.5	basis	points	each	period.	This	fall	in	gilts	yield	accompanied	by	the	low	policy	rate	
results	in	changes	in	the	relative	cost	of	corporate	bonds	and	consequently	has	significant	implications	for	
BFs.	 The	 reaction	 of	 banks	 to	 this	 fall	 in	 BFs’	 borrowing	 depends	 on	 the	 capital	 adequacy	 regime	 in	
operation.	Hence,	the	behaviour	of	banks	is	investigated	under	three	scenarios	that	reflect	three	possible	
capital	 requirements	 regimes.	 The	 latter	 influence	 the	 lending	 behaviour	 of	 banks	 to	 households	 and	
SMEs.	
Figure	2:	Representation	of	the	Agent-based	Model	of	UK	Bank	Lending	
	
Notes:	The	components	inside	the	dashed	area	correspond	to	agent	behaviours	that	are	endogenous,	while	the	data	for	the	rest	will	be	supplied	
exogenously.	The	latter	includes	asset	yields,	the	income	and	consumption	expenditure	of	households,	house	prices,	the	physical	capital	and	
operating	profits	of	businesses.	HHs:	households;	BFs:	big	nonfinancial	companies;	SMEs:	small	and	medium	enterprises			
3.2.1 Households Behaviour  
	We	assume	each	household	earns	an	income	and	accumulates	its	wealth	at	each	period	only	in	the	
form	of	houses	and	cash	deposited	with	its	assigned	bank.	The	demand	for	mortgages	is	governed	by	HH	
incomes.		It	is	assumed	that	HHs’	incomes	fluctuates	by	0.275%	each	month	in	line	with	inflation	between	
March	2009	and	March	2013	as	average	annual	inflation	rate	in	the	UK	was	3.3%	during	that	period.		
	 𝐻𝐻𝐼#,% = 𝐻𝐻𝐼#,%'(× 1 +/− 0.03312 	 (1)	
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Here,			𝐻𝐻𝐼#,%	is	the	income	of	household	i	in	period	t.	
We	assume	that	HHs	keep	constant	their	expenditure	habits	of	spending	between	66%	-70%	of	 income	
on	consumption.16The	remaining	30%	of	income	is	added	to	HH	cash	reserves	which	are	used	to	pay	the	
mortgage	 obligations	 (mortgage	 principal	 and	 interest)	 and	 to	 cover	 the	 deposit	 if	 a	 new	mortgage	 is	
obtained.	 	 	 Denoting	 housing	wealth	 of	 household	 i	 in	 period	 t	 as	𝐻𝐻𝐻#,%	 ,	 it	 can	 grow	 only	with	 the	
allocation	 of	 a	 new	mortgage,	𝑁𝑀#,%,	 to	 household	 i	 in	 period	 t	 with	 a	 5%	 loan	 to	 value	 ratio	 in	 the	
benchmark	simulation:	
	 𝐻𝐻𝐻#,% = 𝐻𝐻𝐻#,%'( + 10.95×𝑁𝑀#,%	 (2)	
	
The	conditions	regarding	whether	a	HH	makes	a	mortgage	application	and	the	acceptance	of	the	same	by	
the	bank	it	is	assigned	to	is	determined	in	part	as	follows.			A	HH	who	is	a	first	time	buyer	is	given	a	higher	
probability	of	making	a	mortgage	application	of	30%	compared	to	that	of	a	20%	probability	for	those	who	
already	own	one.	In	the	eligibility	criteria,	HH	disposable	income	or	cash	at	time	after	mortgage	payments	
is	denoted	as	𝐻𝐻𝐶#,%,	and		𝑀𝑃#,%	is	the	payment	paid	by	household	i	to	their	bank	in	period	t.		This	is	given	
in	 (3),	with	𝑃𝑃#,%	and	𝐼𝑃#,%,	 respectively	denoting	 	principal	and	 interest	parts	of	 the	mortgage	payment	
and	given	in	(4)	.	 𝐻𝐻𝐶#,% = 𝐻𝐻𝐶#,%'( + 0.3	𝐻𝐻𝐼#,% − 0.050.95𝑁𝑀#,% − 𝑀𝑃#,%	 (3)	
	
	 𝑀𝑃#,% = 𝑃𝑃#,% + 𝐼𝑃#,%	 (4)	
	
Here,	mortgage	principal	repayments		and	interest	payments	are	calculated	as	in	(5)	and	(6).										
	 𝑃𝑃#,% = 0.95360 ×𝑁𝑜𝑀#,%×𝐻𝑃%'(	 (5)	
	
	 𝐼𝑃#,% = 𝑟<<,%'(12 ×𝐻𝐻𝑀#,%'(	 (6)	
	
																																								 																				
16This	is	in	keeping	with	the	UK	consumption	to	GDP	ratio.		In	2009	this	was	around	66.134%,	see	
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.CON.PETC.ZS?locations=GB	.	
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Note,	𝐻𝑃%:	house	price	 in	period	t;	𝑁𝑜𝑀#,%:	 the	number	of	mortgages	owed	by	household	 i	 in	period	t;	𝐻𝐻𝑀#,%:	the	mortgage	indebtedness	of	household	i	in	period	t;	𝑟<<,%:	interest	rate	on	mortgages	in	period	
t.	
						We	 denote	 𝑀𝐸𝑙𝑔#,%	 as	 the	 indicator	 for	 mortgage	 eligibility	 of	 household	 i	 to	 apply	 for	 a	 new	
mortgage	 in	period	 t	and	𝑀𝐴𝑣B # ,%	 is	an	 indicator	 for	new	mortgages	which	determines	whether	bank	
assigned	 to	 household	 i	 is	 willing	 to	 lend.	 The	 value	 of	 this	 indicator	 will	 be	 derived	 from	 the	 bank	
behaviour	 described	 later.	 These	minimum	 requirements	 employed	 by	 the	 banks	 are	 given	 in	 (7).	 	 To	
obtain	a	new	mortgage,	banks	require	the	applicant	HH	to	have	a	disposable	income,	𝐻𝐻𝐶#,%'(,	that		is	at		
least	twice	the	down	payment	or	the	deposit	(5%	of	the	house	price		(0.05	×𝐻𝑃%)	and	have	no	more	than	
5	mortgages.	 	 Further,	 mortgage	 payment	 in	 the	 coming	month	 should	 be	 no	more	 than	 40%	 of	 HH	
income	,viz.	𝑀𝑃#,%D( 	≤ 0.4	×	𝐻𝐻𝐼#,%	𝑖𝑛	 7 .	
	 𝑀𝐸𝑙𝑔#,% = 1 𝑖𝑓	𝐻𝐻𝐶#,%'( ≥ 2×0.05	×𝐻𝑃%	𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝑀𝑃#,%D( 	≤ 0.4	×	𝐻𝐻𝐼#,%	𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝑁𝑜𝑀#,%'( < 50 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 	 (7)	
	
Thus,	 the	 value	 of	 the	 new	 mortgage,	 𝑁𝑀#,%	,	 is	 given	 in	 (8)	 as	 the	 house	 price	 less	 deposit	 if	 the	
conditions	in	(7)	are	met	under	the	proviso	that	the	bank	is	able	to	do	so.			
	 𝑁𝑀#,% = 𝐻𝑃%× 1 − 0.05 																	𝑖𝑓	𝑀𝐴𝑣B # ,% = 1,𝑀𝐸𝑙𝑔#,% = 1		0																																																													𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒																 	 (8)	
	
Equation	(10)	gives	the	HH	net	worth	or	equity	at	time	t,𝐻𝐻𝐸#,%	 ,	as	its	housing	wealth	plus	cash	assets	
less	mortgage	debt			
	
	 𝐻𝐻𝑀#,% = 𝐻𝐻𝑀#,%'( − 𝑃𝑃#,% + 𝑁𝑀#,%	 (9)	
	
	 𝐻𝐻𝐸#,% = 𝐻𝐻𝐻#,%'( + 𝐻𝐻𝐶#,% − 𝐻𝐻𝑀#,%	 (10)	
	
3.2.2 Big Firms (BFs) Behaviour  
As	 stated	 earlier,	 BoE’s	 APP	 decreases	 the	 cost	 of	 corporate	 bonds	 which	 triggers	 portfolio	
rebalancing.	 This	 induces	 BFs	 to	 replace	 part	 of	 their	 bank	 loans	 with	 corporate	 bonds.	 	 The	 model	
assumes	 that	BFs	keep	the	size	of	physical	capital	and	 total	debt	unchanged,	 issue	no	new	equity,	and	
maintain	 a	 constant	 annual	 operating	 profit	 (i.e.	 profit	 before	 interest)	 to	 total	 assets	 ratio	 of	 10%.	 In	
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each	 period,	 a	 BF	 chooses	 the	 debt	 financing	 mixture	 to	 maximize	 its	 net	 profit	 (𝜋#,%)	 which	 is	 the	
difference	between	its	operating	profit	(𝑂𝑃𝑃#,%)	and	the	cost	of	debt	financing:	
	 𝜋#,% = 𝐵𝐹𝑂𝑃𝑃#,% − 𝑟X,%. 𝐵𝐹𝐵𝑑#,% − 𝑟YZ,%. 𝐵𝐹𝐵𝐿#,%	 (11)	
	
Here,𝑟X,%and	 𝑟YZ,%:	 the	 interest	 rates	 on	 bonds	 and	 bank	 loans	 in	 period	 t;	𝐵𝐹𝐵𝑑#,%:	 the	 amount	
outstanding	of	BF	i’s	bonds	in	period	t;	𝐵𝐹𝐵𝐿#,%:	the	amount	of	bank	loans	owed	by	big	firm	i	in	period	t.	
The	comparisons	between	bank	borrowing	and	corporate	bond	issuance	are	based	on	the	interest	costs	
of	the	two	sources.	BFs	will	respond	to	decreases	in	bonds	interest	rate	(rS),	when	it	becomes	equal	to	or	
smaller	than	the	interest	rate	on	bank	borrowing	(rBF),	by	issuing	more	bonds	and	using	the	proceeds	to	
pay	back	part	of	their	bank	loans.	In	other	words,	the	debt	mixture	of	BFs	is	restructured	towards	more	
corporate	debt	and	less	bank	loans	on	average.17	Note,	the	exogenous	components	of	a	BF	balance	sheet	
in	any	period	t	to	do	with	physical	capital	and	gross	operating	profits	of	BFs	will	be	anchored	in	empirical	
data.	Equation	 (12)	 states	 that	 the	physical	 capital	of	 the	BF,	𝐵𝐹𝑃ℎ𝐶#,%	 ,	 remains	unchanged	 from	one	
period	to	the	next,	starting	with	the	initial	distribution	of		
	 𝐵𝐹𝑃ℎ𝐶#,% = 𝐵𝐹𝑃ℎ𝐶#,%'(	 (12)	
	
Equation	(13)	states	the	assumption	that	BF	gross	operating	profits	grow	at	empirically	relevant	rates	in	
terms	of	its	physical	capital	at	time	t:		
	 𝐵𝐹𝑂𝑃𝑃#,% = 0.10× 𝐵𝐹𝑃ℎ𝐶#,%'( 	 (13)	
	
The	 BF	 cash	 holdings,	 is	 net	 of	 the	 interest	 payments	 on	 its	 corporate	 bonds	 and	 bank	 loans:		
	
	 𝐵𝐹𝐶#,% = 𝐵𝐹𝐶#,%'( + 𝐵𝐹𝑂𝑃𝑃#,% − 𝑟X,%. 𝐵𝐹𝐵𝑑#,%'( − 𝑟YZ % . 𝐵𝐹𝐵𝐿#,%'(	 (14)	
	
The	change	 in	 the	debt	composition	of	big	 firm	 i	 in	period	 t18,∆𝐵𝐹𝐷𝐶#,%	 ,	which	 is	key	 to	 the	portfolio	
balancing	response	to	the	lower	yield	on	debt	as	a	result	of	APP	is	given	as	follows	in	(15).	 	The	status	
quo,	with	bank	loans	favoured	over	bond	issuance,	is	maintained	if,	as	stated	in	(15),	the	bond	yield,	rS,t	
																																								 																				
17	In	a	future	edition	of	our	ACE	model,	the	extent	to	which	funds	raised	by	BFs	from	bonds	are	apportioned	between	repayment	of	bank	loans	
and	 share	 repurchases	 will	 be	 modeled	 more	 explicitly.	 In	 view	 of	 the	 massive	 trend	 in	 the	 use	 of	 funds	 from	 bond	 issues	 for	 share	
repurchases,	our	model	could	overstate	the	switch	away	from	bank	loans	by	BFs.	An	explicit	BF	model	that	maximizes	earnings	per	share	
(EPS)	 or	 net	 profits	 divided	 by	 the	 number	 of	 shares	 outstanding	 indicates	 that	 the	 return	 on	 capital,	 ROE,	 can	 be	 increased	 either	 by	
increasing	net	profits	 (lowering	 the	debt	cost	 in	our	analysis)	or	 reduce	 the	number	of	 shares	outstanding	 through	share	 repurchases	or	
buybacks.	
18This	variable	is	calibrated	to	the	actual	growth	of	BFs	loans	between	March	2009	and	April	2013.	
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is	 greater	 than	 interest	 on	 bank	 loans,	 rBF,t.	 	 If	 the	 opposite	 is	 the	 case,	 bank	 loans	 to	 BFs	 can	 be	
decreased	by	upto		1.45%	19as	follows:	
	
	 ∆𝐵𝐹𝐷𝐶#,% = 0 																				𝑖𝑓	𝑟X,% ≥ 𝑟YZ,%𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 −0.014598; 	0.009904 																				𝑖𝑓	𝑟X,% < 𝑟YZ,% 	 (15)	
	
	 𝐵𝐹𝐵𝐿#,% = 𝐵𝐹𝐵𝐿#,%'( + ∆𝐵𝐹𝐷𝐶#,%	 (16)	
	 𝐵𝐹𝐵𝑑#,% = 𝐵𝐹𝐵𝑑#,%'( − ∆𝐵𝐹𝐷𝐶#,%	 (17)	
	
Hence,	the	net	worth	or	equity	of	firms	𝐵𝐹𝐸#,%is	given	as	:	
	
	 𝐵𝐹𝐸#,% = 𝐵𝐹𝑃ℎ𝐶#,% + 𝐵𝐹𝐶#,% − 𝐵𝐹𝐵𝐿#,% − 𝐵𝐹𝐵𝑑#,%	 (18)	
	
3.2.3 Bank Lending Behaviour  
As	 indicated,	 new	 bank	 lending	 for	mortgages	 and	 to	 SMEs	 is	 driven	 by	 the	 portfolio	 rebalancing	
implemented	by	BFs	in	response	to	APP	induced	lower	bond	yields.	We	assume	that	banks	do	not	issue	
new	externally	financed	equity,	and	do	not	distribute	any	dividends	and	hence	avail	of	new	equity	only	
from	retained	earnings	or	as	relevant	by	changing	the	composition	of	its	risk	weighted	assets.		Banks	aim	
to	 smooth	 their	 total	 stock	 of	 lending	 to	 HHs	 and	 non-financial	 firms	 and	 if	 they	 suffer	 reduced	 loan	
demand	or	increased	loan	repayments	by	BFs,	they	will	attempt	to	compensate	this	by	lending	to	HHs	for	
mortgages	or	to	SMEs	subject	to	capital	constraints	and	perceived	credit	risks.	To	investigate	the	impact	
of	regulatory	capital	adequacy	requirements,	the	model	implements	three	different	scenarios:	no	capital	
requirements,	a	Basel	 I	 simple	 	 capital	 requirements	where	equity	 capital	 is	a	 fixed	proportion	of	 total	
lending,	and	 the	more	complex	case	where	equity	capital	 satisfies	a	 ratio	of	 risk	weighted	assets.	 	The	
main	behavioural	difference	that	the	introduction	of	Basel	rules	have	brought	about	is	an	addition	to	the		
banks’	 use	 of	 credit	 risk	 estimates	 on	 an	ad	 hominem	 basis	 in	 the	 pre	 Basel	 regime.	 This	 involves	 an	
institutionalized	implementation	of	a	Basel	complaint	cost	of	capital	measure.		In	summary	:	To	track	the	
impact	of	a	QE-generated	fall	in	demand	for	bank	loans	by	BFs,	banks	change	their	portfolio	of	loans	only	
to	 optimally	 accommodate	 the	 slack	 in	 demand	 in	 the	 total	 lending	 due	 to	 big	 firm	 substitution	 away	
from	bank	loans.	
	
																																								 																				
19This	is	a	historically	relevant	maximum	fall	in	bank	loans	in	a	month	for	non-financial	firms.		
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3.2.3.1	Scenario	I:	No	Capital	Requirements	
In	this	scenario,	banks	do	not	have	regulatory	equity	capital	requirements.	A	bank	grants	mortgages	
and	loans	to	SMEs	to	maximize	its	profit	pB,t	,	which	is	given	by	the	following	equation:	
	 ( ), , , , , ,. . .p = -å åB t i t i t i t i t i tr L s L L 	 (19)	
	
Here	i	=	{BF,	HH,	SME}:	the	agent	class;	Li,t:	bank	lending	to	class	i	agents	at	time	t;	ri,t:	interest	rate	on	
loans	class	i	agents	at	time	t;	si,t(Li,t):	default	risk	cost	of	class	i	agents	at	time	t	(i.e.	the	probability	that	an	
agent	 of	 class	 i	 defaults)	 which	 increases	 in	 the	 amount	 of	 lending	 to	 class	 i	 agents.	 We	 assume	 for	
simplicity	 that	 the	 default	 risk	 costs	 are	 quadratic	 ,	 si,t(Li,t)=	 Li,t2.	As	 discussed	 earlier,	 banks	 proxy	 the	
default	risk	for	each	class	of	loans	in	terms	of	the	non-performing	loans	at	each	time	t	reported	as	write	
offs	by	UK	banks	 for	 the	 loan	class	 (see	Appendix	 	 	 	 ).	The	optimal	amounts	of	mortgages	and	 loans	to	
SMEs	in	this	case	rely	on	the	difference	between	the	interest	rates	of	the	two	types	of	loans	(rHH	and	rSME),		
the	ratio	of	the	default	risk	of	the	other	loan	product	to	the	total	default	risk	of	both	loan	products	and	
the	amount	available	for	investment	in	the	two	types	(i.e.	the	amount	of	total	lending	minus	loans	to	BFs	
).	 Assuming	 that	 banks	 aim	 to	 keep	 the	 amount	 of	 total	 lending	 for	 these	 categories	 of	 loans	 fixed		
(𝐿bc% = 𝐿YZ,% + 𝐿<<,% + 𝐿Xde,%)	and	aims	to	reallocate	optimally	between	HHs	and	SMEs	what	remains	
after	the	wholly	demand	determined	BF	loan,	we	have:	20	
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The	first	result	here	is	that	the	banks	operate	without	an	explicit	cost	of	capital,	and		even	if	there	are	
larger	default	costs	on	 loans	 to	SMEs	 in	 (20),	𝑠Xde,% > 𝑠<<,%,	 this	need	not	 imply	a	natural	bias	 toward	
mortgage	loans	as	rSME	could	be	greater	than	rHH.		However,	equations	(20)	and	(21)	indicate	that	a	fall	in	
loans	to	BFs,	vizD 𝐿YZ,% < 	0	,	driven	by	the	lower	bond	yields,	will	likewise	induce	banks	to	increase	their	
supply	of	mortgages	to	HHs	to	a	greater	extent	than	 loans	to	SMEs.	This	 is	governed	by	the	respective	
comparative	static	conditions	which	we	denote	as	ɵHH	and	ɵSME:	
																																								 																				
20Note	given	the	assumptions	made,	the	optimal	lending	equations	in	(20)	and	(21)	are	obtained	from	the	profit	function	given	as	𝜋Y.% = 		 𝑟YZ,%𝐿YZ,% 	+ 		𝑟<<,%𝐿<<,% + 	𝑟Xde,% 𝐿bc% − 	𝐿YZ,% − 	𝐿<<,% − 		 𝑠YZ,%𝐿YZ,%	g 		-		𝑠<<,%𝐿<<,%	g 	-	𝑠Xde,%(𝐿bc%,% − 	𝐿YZ,% − 	𝐿<<,%)g. 
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Hence,	each	bank	follows	the	following	optimal	behavioural	rules	when	deciding	the	supply	of	new	
loans	to	be	granted	(∆𝐿<<,%,	and	∆𝐿Xde,%):21	
( )*, , , 1 ,q-D = - + DHH t HH t HH t HH BF tL L L L 	 (24)	
	
( )*, , , 1 ,q-D = - + DSME t SME t SME t SME BF tL L L L 	 (25)	
	
Equations	 (24)and	 (25)combines	 the	 optimal	 loan	 levels( * ,HH tL &
*
,SME tL )given	 in	 Equations	 (20)	 and	 (21)	
and	the	impact	of	changes	in	BF	demand	for	banks	loans	given	in	Equations	(22)	and	(23).			
3.2.3.2	Scenario	II:	Simple	Capital	Requirements	with	No	Risk	Weights	
To	 introduce	 the	 capital	 adequacy	 requirements,	 which	 state	 that	 at	 least	 a	 fraction	 γReq	 of	 bank	
assets	must	be	financed	by	equity,	into	the	model,	we	follow	Aliaga-Díaz,	Olivero,	and	Powell	(2011)	who	
state	that	if	a	bank	has	insufficient	capital,	it	is	subject	to	a	cost	that	increases	with	the	distance	between	
the	 required	capital	 to	asset	 ratio	and	 the	actual	one.	Hence,	 the	profit	 function	of	a	bank	 in	 this	case	
becomes:	
	 ( ) ( ), , , , , , ,1 1. . . .log .p d µ g g
æ öæ ö
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å åB t i t i t i t i t i t Tot t
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𝛽 = 𝜇. 𝑙𝑜𝑔 1𝛾 − 1𝛾lmn 	
	
																																								 																				
21If	 the	amount	 in	Equations	 (24)	and/or	 is	negative,	 this	means	 that	 the	bank	will	not	grant	any	new	mortgages	orloans	 to	Similarly,	 if	 the	
amount	of	in	Equation	(25	is	negative,	the	bank	would	reduce	its	lending	proportionally	to	all	its	SME	clients.		The	same	applies	to	the	similar	
equations	presented	later	in	Scenarios	II	and	III.	
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Here	E:	bank	equity	capital,	 1
,
.d s -æ ö= ç ÷
è ø
t
Tot t
E
L
:	the	cost	of	equity	capital	per	£1	of	total	lending;	σ:	the	cost	of	
equity	capital	estimated	by	using	the	Capital	Asset	Pricing	Model	(CAPM)22.	Note	𝛽	 is	the	cost	of	having	
insufficient	equity	or	the	cost	of	noncompliance	with	the	capital	rules,	and	we	can	aggregate	these	costs	
a d b= + 	as	they	apply	to	total	lending	.	Note	1/g	is	the	leverage	which	in	the	case	of	a	8%	capital	ratio	
is	 12.5.	 	 The	main	 change	 in	 the	banks’	 calculation	of	 the	profitability	of	 loans	 in	 the	 case	of	 a	 simple	
regulatory	capital	requirement	 is	the	direct	cost	of	equity,	d,	 in	(26)	and	also	the	penalty	for	deviations	
from	 the	 Basel	 approved	 leverage.	 The	 operational	 aspects	 of	 the	 binding	 capital	 constraints	 are	
governed	by	 the	μ	which	 is	 an	 indicator	 function	 in	 Equation	 (26)	 the	 values	 for	which	 are	 defined	 as	
follows:	
	 𝜇 = 1 							𝑖𝑓	𝛾% < 0.080 																				𝑖𝑓	0.10 ≥ 	 𝛾% ≥ 0.080 					𝑖𝑓	𝛾% > 0.10 	 (27)	
	
	
In	addition	to	the	required	equity	to	assets	ratio	(γReq)	of	8%,	an	optional	buffer	of	2%	is	stipulated	as	in	
Repullo	and	Suarez	(2013).	 	The	cost	of	noncompliance	with	the	capital	rules	is	assumed	to	be	very	high	
and	can	lead	to	bank	failure.		To	avoid	this	high	cost,	banks	try	to	keep	equity	to	asset	ratio	very	close	to	
10%.	In	other	words,	each	bank	will	change	its	total	lending	to	ensure	that	equity	to	total	lending	ratio	is		
between	8%	and	10%	(i.e.	8%	<γt<	10%).This	means	that	the	upper	bound	of	the	feasible	amount	of	total	
lending	in	any	period	t	( ,Tot tL )	which	maintains	the	10%	equity	to	total	lending	is	estimated:	
, 1 ,10 -= =åTot t t i tL E L ,	if	8%	<γt-1	<	10%		and	LTot,t#< ,Tot tL 	if	γt-1	<	8%.	 (28)	
	
Thus,	total	lending	has	to	be	reduced	from	 ,Tot tL 	if	γt-1	<	8%	and	we	will	denote	this	as	LTot,t
#.	
Accordingly,	the	profit	function	of	the	bank	can	be	rewritten	as	follows:	
	 ( ) ( ), , , , , , ,1 1. . . .log .p d µ g g
æ öæ ö
= - - - -ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷è øè ø
å åB t i t i t i t i t i t Tot t
t req
r L s L L L 	 (29)	
	
As	the	total	capital	costs	a d b= + ,	apply	equally	to	every	£1	lent	irrespective	of	the	category	of	
loan,	the	optimal	amounts	of	mortgages	and	loans	to	SMEs	in	this	Scenario	2	(	highlighted	with	a	double	
																																								 																				
22For	example,	see	Rizzi	(2013).	
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asterisks	**)	correspond	with	the	result	in	Scenario	(1)	with	the	only	difference	being	the	upper	bound	
and	(the		lower	bound)	of	the	total	amount	of	lending	being	given	by	 ,Tot tL in	(28).		
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Equations	 (31)	 &	 (32)	 indicate	 that	 a	 fall	 in	 loans	 to	 BFs	 induces	 banks	 to	 increase	 its	 supply	 of	
mortgages	and	loans	to	SMEs	using	the	comparative	static	conditions	ɵHH	and	ɵSME	(equations	22&	23)	as	
in	Scenario	I.	The	behavioural	rules	a	bank	follows	when	deciding	the	supply	of	new	loans	to	be	granted	
(∆𝐿<<,%,	and	∆𝐿Xde,%)	depend	on	the	value	of	its	equity	to	total	 lending	in	the	previous	period	(γt-1).	 In	
this	context,	we	distinguish	between	the	three	possible	cases	shown	below.	
	Case	A:ϻ	=	0	and	8%	<	γt-1<	10%:	
In	this	case	a	bank	will	maintain	its	total	lending	unchanged,	and	will	change	the	size	of	mortgages	
and	loans	to	SMEs	only	if	there	was	a	change	in	the	stock	of	its	loans	to	BFs:		
( ), ,.qD = DHH t HH BF tL L 	
			
(33)	
	
( ), ,.qD = DSME t SME BF tL L 	
			
(34)	
	
Case	B:ϻ	=	0	and	γt-1>10%:	
In	this	case,	the	bank	has	excess	lending	capacity	that	it	can	use	to	grant	more	mortgages	and	loans	
to	SMEs.	Consequently,	analogous	to	Scenario	I,	the	supply	of	new	loans	to	be	granted	will	be	as	follows:	
( )**, , , 1 ,HH t HH t HH t HH BF tL L L Lq-D = - + D 	 (35)	
	
( )**, , , 1 ,SME t SME t SME t SME BF tL L L Lq-D = - + D 	 (36)	
	 	
	
	
Case	C:	ϻ	=	1	(or	γt-1<8%):	
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A	bank	facing	this	situation	is	over-lending	and	will	decrease	its	total	lending		to	LTot,t#	as	noted	in	(28)	
to	decrease	the	cost	of	noncompliance	with	the	capital	adequacy	rules.	The	behavioural	rules	will	follow	
(35)	and	(36)	with	LTot,t#	replacing	the	capital	complaint	upper	bound	for	total	loans	given	there.		
	
3.2.3.3	Scenario	III:	Complex	Fractional	Capital	Requirements	with	Risk	Weights	
Like	Scenario	II,	banks	are	required	to	finance	a	fraction	of	their	asset	using	equity	capital.	However,	
the	capital	requirements	in	Scenario	III	assign	different	risk	weights	to	different	types	of	assets	following	
Basel	II/III	and	the	capital	requirements	take	the	form	of	an	equity	to	risk	weighted	asset	ratio	specified	in	
below	in	(37).			The	profit	function	of	a	bank	in	this	case	takes	the	following	formula:	
	 ( ) ( )#, , , , , , ,# #1 1. . . '.log .B t i t i i t i t i t i t Tot t
i req
r L s L L Lp d µ
g g
æ öæ ö
= - - - -ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷è øè ø
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Here	wBF<wHH<wSME:	risk	weights	for	loans	to	BFs,	mortgages,	and	loans	to	SMEs,	respectively;	E:	bank	
equity	capital;	𝛿## = 𝜎#. 𝑤#. erstuvwr,rst:	the	cost	of	equity	capital	per	£1	of	lending	to	class	i	agents;	σ#:	the	
cost	of	equity	capital	estimated	by	using	the	Capital	Asset	Pricing	Model	(CAPM);	γReq#:	the	required	
equity	to	risk	weighted	assets	ratio;	γ#:	the	actual	equity	to	risk	weighted	assets	ratio;	ϻ:	is	a	positive	
parameter.	
As	 in	Scenario	 II,	banks	attempt	 to	maintain	equity	 to	 risk	weighted	assets	 ratio	very	close	 to	10%.	
Therefore,	 the	behaviour	of	a	bank	 in	any	period	t	depends	on	the	value	of	 its	equity	to	 risk	weighted	
assets	(γt#).	Again,	each	bank	will	determine	its	total	lending	to	ensure	that	8%	<γt#<	10%,	which	we	will	
denote		generically	as	 ,Tot tL
#	to	cover	the	range	of	values	this	can	take.	
	
The	first	order	conditions	with	respect	to	mortgages	and	loans	to	SMEs	show	that,	in	addition	to	the	
relative	yields	and	credit	risk,	the	amount	available	for	investment	in	mortgages	and	loans	to	SMEs,	the	
risk	weights	and	bank	equity	have	a	significant	impact	on	the	optimal	allocation	between	the	two	types	of	
loans:		
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Equations	(40)&	(41)	indicate	that	a	fall	in	loans	to	BFs	(LBF)	will	induce	banks	to	increase	mortgages,	
and	to	decrease	loans	to	SMEs	as	per	the	following	comparative	statics	:	
ρHH
*** =
∂LHH
∂LBF
= −
wBF −wSME( )
wHH −wSME
< 0 	 (40)	
	
ρSME
*** =
∂LSME
∂LBF
= −
wBF −wHH( )
wSME −wHH
> 0 	 (41)	
	
Thus,	unlike	Scenarios	I	and	II,	in	Scenario	III,	as	seen	in	equation	(41),	the	slack	in	total	bank	lending	
that	is	brought	about	by	the	portfolio	rebalancing	by	BFs	away	from	bank	loans,	with	D 𝐿YZ,% < 	0,	will	
not	lead	to	any	increase	in	SME	lending	as	the	absolute	differences	in	the	administratively	set	risk	weights	
that	are	biased	against	SMEs	will	militate	against	this.		In	fact	in	Case	C	(see	Scenario	II)	when	banks	are	
under	capitalized	with		γt-1#<8%	,	SMEs	will	lose	loan	share	as	follows:			
ΔLSME ,t
*** = −
1
wSME
. RWAt−1 −
1
0.08
Et−1
!
"
#
$
%
&+ ρSME
*** . ΔLBF ,t( ) 																								 	 	 	 (42)	
The	first	term	is	negative,	and	the	second	term	is	also	negative	from	(41)	when	D 𝐿YZ,% < 	0, 	
The	 risk	weights	used	 in	 the	model	 for	different	 loan	 types	are	 taken	 from	BIPRU	3.4	Risk	weights	
under	the	standardised	approach	to	credit	risk	available	Financial	Conduct	Authority	(FCA).	The	value	of	
these	risk	weights	are	as	follows:	
wBF	 wHH	 wSME	
20%	 50%	 100%	
																								Source:	BIPRU	3.4	Risk	weights	under	the	standardised	approach	to	credit	risk;	Financial	Conduct	Authority		
																																							(FCA);	Available	at:	https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/BIPRU/3/4.html#D591	
	
3.2.4 SMEs Behaviour 
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Like	BFs,	SMEs	have	a	constant	but	lower	annual	operating	profit	to	total	assets	ratio	of	5%,	and	keep	
the	size	of	physical	capital	fixed	over	the	simulation	period.		The	main	characteristic	of	SMEs	is	that	they	
cannot	control	their	debt	financing	(like	BFs)	since	the	single	source	of	this	financing	 is	bank	 loans.	The	
latter	depend	solely	on	banks’	willingness	to	grant	loans	or	extend/renew	current	credit	facilities	to	these	
firms.	 Additionally,	 the	model	 assumes	 that	 SMEs	 have	 unlimited	 demand	 for	 debt	 financing	 and	 that	
they	 cannot	 raise	 further	 external	 equity	 financing	 during	 the	 simulation	 period.	 As	 shown	 above	 in	
Scenario	 III,	 the	Basel	 II/III	 risk	weight	against	SMEs	 loans	 imply	 that	 they	cannot	enjoy	any	 increase	 in	
loans	especially	 in	the	period	of	APP	when	BFs	start	 to	replace	bank	 loans	with	bonds.	This	situation	 is	
more	 drastic	 when	 banks	 suffer	 capital	 inadequacy.	 Consequently,	 the	 components	 of	 a	 SME	 balance	
sheet	in	a	given	period	t	are	as	follows:	
	 𝑆𝑀𝐸𝑃ℎ𝐶#,% = 𝑆𝑀𝐸𝑃ℎ𝐶#,%'(	 (43)	
	
	 𝑆𝑀𝐸𝑂𝑃𝑃#,% = 0.05× 𝑆𝑀𝐸𝑃ℎ𝐶#,%'( + 𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐶#,%'( 	 (44)	
	 𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐶#,% = 𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐶#,%'( + 𝑆𝑀𝐸𝑂𝑃𝑃#,% − 𝑟Xde,%. 𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐵𝐿#,%'( + ∆𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐵𝐿#,%	 (45)	
	 𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐵𝐿#,% = ∆𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐵𝐿#,%'( + ∆𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐵𝐿#,%	 (46)	
	
	 𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐸#,% = 𝑆𝑀𝐸𝑃ℎ𝐶#,% + 𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐶#,% − 𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐵𝐿#,%	 (47)	
	
Here:	𝑆𝑀𝐸𝑃ℎ𝐶#,%:	the	physical	capital	of	SME	i	in	period	t;	𝑆𝑀𝐸𝑂𝑃𝑃#,%:	the	operating	profit	of	SME	i	
in	period	t;	𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐶#,%:	the	cash	holdings	of	SME	i	in	period	t;	𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐵𝐿:	the	amount	of	bank	loans	owed	by	
SME	i	in	period	t;∆𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐵𝐿#,%:	the	change	in	the	amount	outstanding	of	the	bank	loans	granted	to	SME	i	
by	its	bank	in	period	t;	𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐸#,%:	the	equity	of	SMEi	in	period	t.	
	
4.	Initial	ACE	Model	Conditions	and	Simulation	Results		
4.1	ACE	Model	Initial	Conditions,	Policy	Rates	and	Risk	Premia		
Section	3.1	outlined	the	data	driven	agent	characteristics	for	the	UK	economy	and	the	Appendix	has	
given	additional	details	and	the	data	sources	for	this.		
Figure	3:	Initial	Values	of	Interest	Rates	(Annual)	
Interest	Rate	 	 Initial	Value	 	
risk	free	rate	(rRF)
1	 0.5%		
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government	gilts	rate	(rG)
2	 4%		
interest	rate	on	mortgages	(rHH)	 7%	(rRF	+	6.5%)	
interest	rate	on	BFs	loans	(rBF)	 5.5%	(rRF	+	5%)	
interest	rate	on	BFs	bond	debt	(rS)	 6%	(rG	+	2%)	
interest	rate	on	SMEs	loans	(rSME)	 8.5%	(rRF	+	8%)	
1	BoE’s	policy	rate.	(Source:	Bank	of	England	(http://www.bankofengland.co.uk))	
2	Median	yield	on	10-year	gilts	in	2008	Q4	(Source:	DataStream®)	
Figure	A.5	in	the	Appendix	gives	the	initial	conditions	and	the	balance	sheet	data	for	the	agents	as	set	
out	in	Sections	3.2-3.4.		The	only	remaining	variables	that	need	to	be	discussed	are	the	role	of	the	price	
variables.		The	policy	rates	and	lowering	of	bond	yields	triggered	by	APP	are	for	the	most	part	considered	
to	exogenous	to	agents’	behaviour.			
The	model	 includes	 6	 different	 interest	 rates,	 the	 initial	 values	 for	 this	 are	 presented	 in	 Figure	 3	
above.	The	initial	levels	of	these	rates	are	chosen	in	a	way	that	reflects	the	actual	values	(where	possible),	
especially	regarding		the	relative	riskiness	of	debt	instruments.	First,	the	risk-free	rate	(rRF)	and	gilts	rate	
are	set	to	the	actual	levels	of	BoE	policy	rate	(0.5%)	and	10-year	gilts	rate	(4%)	just	before	the	launch	of	
APP	in	2009	with	the	mortgage	rates	and	the	bond	rates,	respectively,	tracking	this	over	time.	 	Second,	
premia	on	different	 types	of	bank	 loans	are	given	to	reflect	 the	credit	 risk	or	default	probability	of	 the	
loans	and	the	cost	of	capital	for	banks.		In	Figure	3,	loans	to	SMEs	are	given	the	highest	initial	premia	of	
8%,	followed	by	6.5%	for	mortgages	and	5%	for	loans	to	BFs.			Lastly,	in	the	immediate	pre	APP	period	of	
2009,	the	fact	that	the	corporate	bonds	represented	only	32.7%	of	nonfinancial	corporations’	total	debt	
in	2009	Q1	indicates	that	the	cost	of	these	bonds	was	higher	than	the	cost	of	bank	loans.	Hence,	the	risk	
premium	on	BFs	bonds	(above	gilts	rate)	 is	set	at	2%	 initially	 to	make	the	 interest	rate	on	these	bonds	
higher	than	interest	rate	on	BFs	loans.		
4.2 Simulation Results 
As	stated	earlier,	the	model	in	this	paper	covers	a	period	of	50	months	from	the	start	of	APP	in	2009	
and	it	involves	the	micro	simulations	of	the	interaction	between	different	agents	and	the	responses	of	
these	agents	to	the	developments	in	debt	markets.			
Figure	4:	The	Proportion	of	Successful	Mortgage	Applications	(Monthly)	-	Simulated	
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At	 any	 given	month	 t,	 asset	 purchases	 under	 APP	 lead	 to	 an	 exogenous	 fall	 in	 gilts	 yield	which	 is	
reflected	 in	 the	 yield	 of	 corporate	 bonds	 through	 the	 portfolio	 rebalancing	 effect.	 BFs	 start	 to	 change	
their	debt	 financing	structure	when	the	cost	of	bonds	become	 lower	than	bank	 loans	cost.	Meanwhile,	
each	 household	 receives	 its	 income,	 finances	 its	 consumption,	 pay	 its	 mortgage	 instalment,	 and	
accumulates	 the	 rest	 into	 its	 cash	holdings.	 	 The	 first	 set	of	 results	 that	are	pertinent	are	 the	monthly	
rates	of	mortgage	approvals	under	the	3	bank	capital	regime	given	in	Figure	4.			These	hold	the	key	to	the	
systematic	bias	in	bank	lending	in	favour	of	mortgages	in	the	Basel	II/III	risk	weighted	regime.		While	all	3	
scenarios	 show	a	downward	 trend	 in	mortgage	approvals,	 scenario	3	dominates	and	 to	a	 lesser	extent	
scenario	1	shows	follows	driven	as	it	is	by	the	relative	credit	risks	given	in	the	estimates	proxied	by	bank	
write	off	(see	Appendix	A.3	Figure).			
Figure	5:	Actual	Lending	Aggregates	
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Source:	Bank	of	England’s	Bankstats	(http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/Pages/bankstats/default.aspx)	
We	will	now	analyse	the	results	in	terms	of	the	aggregate	lending	in	terms	of	mortgages,	loans	to	BFs,	
and	loans	to	SMEs	for	the	3	scenarios	given	in	Figures	5-7,	respectively	.	 	To	make	them	comparable	to	
actual	 data	 given	 in	 Figure	 5,	 the	 amounts	 of	mortgages,	 loans	 to	 BFs,	 and	 loans	 to	 SMEs	 have	 been	
rescaled	up	using	the	proportions	between	the	actual	and	the	hypothetical	numbers	of	the	agents.		The	
main	exogenous	operative	factor	is	that	BFs	do	not	change	their	debt	structure	during	the	first	20	periods	
till	the	APP	impact	on	bond	yields	bite	and	the	cost	of	security	debt	is	still	bigger	than	the	cost	of	bank	
borrowing.	 The	 actual	 data	 in	Figure	 5	 shows	 how	 the	 total	 bank	 loans	 for	 the	 classes	 of	 loans	 under	
consideration	starts	at	about	£1.6	trillion	 in	2009	shows	a	relative	peak	 in	March	2010	at	£1.81	Trillion	
after	a	severe	crunch	and	then	trends	downwards	to	£1.75	Trillion	in	March	2013.		The	breakdown	shows	
that	 only	 mortgages	 grew	 from	 £0.81	 Trillion	 in	 2009	 to	 £0.95%	 in	 2013,	 while	 other	 loans	 types	 ,	
respectively,	 fell	over	 this	period	 from	£0.62	Trillion	 to	£0.45	Trillion	 for	BFs	and	 from	£0.18	Trillion	 to	
£0.15	Trillion	for	SMEs.	
Figure	6:	Simulated	Bank	Lending	Aggregates	(Complex	Capital	Requirements;	Risk	Weights)	
	 Scenario	3	(see	section	3.2.4	)	
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								The	main	results	here	is	as	expected,	only	the	extant	Basel	II/III	scenario	3,	Figure	6,	corresponds	
with	the	actual	data	and	produces	the	result	that	while	overall	 lending	falls,	only	the	mortgage	 lending	
picks	up	somewhat	while	bank	lending	to	the	real	economy	fall.			In	the	simulated	results	given	in	Figure	6	
show	a	very	close	correspondence	with	the	actual	data	though	the	2013	March	total	lending	is	somewhat	
smaller	 at	 £1.5	 Trillion.	 	 Scenario	 3	 simulated	 mortgage	 lending	 starts	 at	 about	 £0.9	 Trillion	 in	 2009,	
shows	the	similar	peak	as	with	the	actual	data	in	July	2010	of	about	£0.9	Trillion	and	falls	to	£0.8	Trillion.		
Lending	to	BFs	start	at	£0.6	Trillion	and	falls	to	£0.53	Trillion	in	March	2013,	while	SMEs	suffer	a	larger	fall	
from	£0.15	Trillion	in	2009	to	£0.08	Trillion	in	2013.		This	is	exactly	as	we	had	indicated	as	to	how	banks	
will	respond	to	the	conditions	of	APP	when	operating	under	Basel	II/III	risk	weights.			
There	is	a	systematic	bias	against	SME	lending	which	operates	in	an	iron	clad	way.		In	is	important	to	
note	 that	 while	 our	 result	 is	 not	 inconsistent	 with	 the	 studies	 of	 	 Thakor	 (1996),	 Hans	 et	 al.	 (1999),	
andHeid,	 Porath	 and	 Stolz	 (2004)	 results,	 in	 that	 banks	 suffering	 from	 capital	 inadequacy	 will	 look	 to	
improve	their	capital	status	by	shifting	out	of	high	risk	weigthed	loans/assets,	the	ACE	model	here	builds	
a	more	detailed	conditions	of	APP	that	triggered	a	series	of	events	which	reduced	both	BF	loans	and	loans	
to	 SMEs.	 	 SMEs	 suffered	 disproportionately	 only	 due	 to	 their	 unfavourable	 Basel	 risk	 weights.	 As	 the	
results	 from	 the	 other	 2	 scenarios	 show,	 there	 was	 nothing	 in	 the	 economic	 credit	 risk	 conditions	
surrounding	SMEs	that	this	should	have	been	the	case.	
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Figure	7:	Simulated	Bank	Lending	Aggregates	(Simple	Capital	Requirements;	No	Risk	Weights)	
														Scenario	2	(see	section	3.2.3)	
	
Thus,	in	contrast	to	the	simulated	outputs	from	scenario	3,	the	other	2	scenarios	do	not	show	a	fall	in	
lending	to	SMEs	and	BFs.		In	the	case	of	scenario	2,	Figure	7,		SME’s	enjoy	about	the	same	level	of	loans	
around	 £0.1	 Trillion	 and	 in	 fact	 enjoys	 and	 increase	 to	 about	 £0.12	 Trillion	 in	 2013	March.	 	 Likewise,	
lending	to	BFs	increase	from	£0.42	Trillion	in	2009	to	£0.6	Trillion.			It	is	expected	that	Basel	I	unweighted	
8%	capital	implies	identical	leverage	of	10-12.5	for	all	asset	classes,	could	reduce	total	lending	compared	
with	scenario	3.	Hence	total	 lending	 in	2009	was	£1.3	Trillion	below	the	actual	data	of	 	£1.6	Trillion,	 in	
March	 2013,	 scenario	 2	 shows	 about	 the	 same	 level	 of	 total	 lending	 as	 lending	 as	 scenario	 3	 at	 £1.5	
Trillion.	But	what	 is	 interesting	 is	 that	with	a	 lack	of	bias,	 the	growth	 in	mortgage	 lending	 is	not	at	 the	
expense	of	loans	to	BFs	and	SMEs.			
		 Finally,	 the	 is	 a	 counterintuitive	 result	 regarding	 scenario	 1,Figure	 8,	 which	 shows	 the	 lowest	
amount	of	 total	 lending	at	about	£1.5	Trillion	 in	2009	 -	£1.2	Trillion	 in	2013	March.	 	The	 idea	 that	 the	
absence	of	an	explicit	regulatory	capital	rule	need	not	lead	to	excessive	lending	runs	contrary	to	the	what	
is	often	assumed.	Indeed,	as	long	as	the	banks	are	guided	by	the	optimal	rule	based	on	the	relative	credit	
risk	 proxies	 given	 in	 section	 3.2,	 there	 is	 clearly	 no	 threat	 of	 excessive	 lending.	 	 Also,	 the	 lack	 of	 bias	
against	SME	 lending	means	that	this	category	of	 lending	remains	stable	at	about	£0.15	Trillion	through	
out		the	conditions	of	APP	in	scenario	1.			
Figure	8:	Simulated	Bank	Lending	Aggregates	(No	Capital	Requirements)	
																			Scenario	1	(see	section	3.2.2)	
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4.3 Model Validation 
Several	validation	methods	have	been	used	to	validate	simulated	models	in	engineering	in	computer	
sciences.	 For	 instance,	 Sargent	 (2013)	 outlines	 17	 techniques	 that	 can	 be	 used	 to	 validate	 simulation	
models.	These	techniques	use	logical	reasoning,	quantitative	methods,	or	visual	representation	to	verify	
the	soundness	of	simulated	models.	One	of	these	techniques,	historical	data	(or	empirical)	validation,	is	
recommended	by	Windrum,	Fagiolo	and	Moneta	(2007)	to	assess	models	in	the	context	of	ACME.	In	their	
history-friendly	approach,	 a	good	model	 is	one	 that	can	generate	several	 stylized	 facts	observed	 in	 the	
actual	 data.	 To	 validate	 the	model	 of	 this	 paper,	 this	 section	examines	 the	degree	 to	which	 simulated	
lending	aggregates	represent	actual	lending	aggregates.	To	do	that,	two	sets	of	regressions	are	run.	In	the	
first	set,	each	of	the	time	series	of	simulated	and	actual	lending	aggregates	is	regressed	on	time	(t),	then	
the	outcomes	of	regressions	are	compared	between	each	simulated	series	and	the	corresponding	actual	
series.	The	regressions	in	the	second	group	investigate	the	correlation	between	simulated	and	actual	data	
by	 regressing	 each	 actual	 time	 series	 on	 the	 corresponding	 simulated	 one.	 The	 summary	 of	 the	
regressions	is	presented	in	Figure9	and	Figure10.	This	is	done	for	the	scenario	3	simulated	results.		The	R2		
results,	given	in	Figure	9	of	scenario	3,	which	corresponds	with	the	regime	in	situ	clearly	outperformed	
the	regressions	results	of	the	other	2	scenarios	(not	reported).	
Figure9:	Summary	of	the	Simulated	and	Actual	Bank	Lending	Aggregates	Regressions	on	Time	
Variable	 Coefficient	on	time	 Standard	Error	 p	value	 R2	
Simulated	BFs	Loans	 1.64	×	1010	 1.51	×	109	 0.00	 0.7059	
Actual	BFs	Loans	 1.80	×	1010	 1.68	×	109	 0.00	 0.7008	
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Simulated	SMEs	Loans	 4.87	×	109	 4.26	×	108	 0.00	 0.7269	
Actual	SMEs	Loans	 5.18	×	109	 4.71	×	108	 0.00	 0.7122	
Simulated	Mortgages	 2.93	×	1010	 2.17	×	109	 0.00	 0.7879	
Actual	Mortgages	 2.91	×	1010	 2.04	×	109	 0.00	 0.8063	
Simulated	Total	lending	 5.06	×	1010	 4.11	×	109	 0.00	 0.7557	
Actual	Total	lending	 5.23	×	1010	 4.17	×	109	 0.00	 0.7574	
	
Figure10:	Summary	of	the	Regression	of	Actual	on	Simulated	Bank	Lending	Aggregates		
Variable	
Coefficient	on	the	
Simulated	Variable	
Standard	Error	 p	value	 R2	
Actual	BFs	Loans	 1.100397	 0.125398	 0.00	 0.9937	
Actual	SMEs	Loans	 1.073266	 0.0112729	 0.00	 0.9946	
Actual	Mortgages	 0.9807749	 0.0074565	 0.00	 0.9972	
Actual	Total	lending	 1.03002	 0.0043908	 0.00	 0.9991	
The	 coefficients	 on	 the	 simulated	 variables	 and	 R2	 values	 in	 Figure10	 reveal	 very	 strong	 (almost	
perfect)	 correlations	 between	 the	 actual	 and	 simulated	 bank	 lending	 aggregates.	 Similarly,	 the	
comparison	between	the	results	of	the	regressions	of	each	of	the	actual	bank	lending	aggregates	with	the	
corresponding	 results	 for	 simulated	 aggregates	 indicate	 that	 the	 simulated	 data	 is	 a	 very	 good	
representation	of	the	actual	data.		But	as	discussed	in	the	outputs	from	the	simulations,	the	response	of	
agents	to	a	regulatory	system	in	place	is	far	from	satisfactory	as	it	leads	to	a	systematic	bias	against	loans	
to	SMEs.	
5. Conclusion 
A	standard	textbook	model	of	bank	lending	starts	with	the	premise	that	banks’	primary	objective	 is	to	
lend	to	non-financial	firms.			We	set	up	a	data	driven	agent	based	model	(ABM)	of	the	UK	bank	lending	
to	households	for	mortgages	and	to	big	firms	and	SMEs	that	reflects	the	reality	on	the	ground	that	this	is	
far	 from	 the	 case.	 In	 the	 context	 of	QE	 and	APP	 launched	by	UK	 authorities	 in	 2009,	 increasing	bank	
lending	 is	 one	of	 the	main	 goals.	 Yet,	ONS	 sectoral	 financial	 accounts	 data	 shows	 that	 although	bank	
lending	 to	 households	 for	mortgages	 has	 been	 expanding	 since	 2009,	 total	 bank	 lending	witnessed	 a	
noticeable	drop	driven	by	a	decrease	in	lending	to	businesses,	especially	to	SMEs.		We	explicitly	take	the	
reduced	 bond	 yields	 in	 the	 course	 of	 APP	 for	 triggering	 a	 portfolio	 rebalancing	 by	 big	 firms	 in	 the	
direction	 of	 bond	 issuance	 and	 a	 substitution	 away	 from	 bank	 loans	 as	 the	 main	 factor	 behind	 the	
demand	side	fall	in	bank	loans	from	big	non-financial	firms.			
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In	the	spirit	of		Stiglitz	(2011)	and	Jones	(2010),	we	focus	on	the	incentives	and	constraints	posed	
by	 the	 Basel	 capital	 adequacy	 rules	 on	 the	 UK	 banking	 system.	 	 The	 ACE	 model	 was	 developed	 to	
investigate	the	conditions	created	by	APP	and	QE	in	the	UK	primarily	on	bank	supply	side	responses	for	
lending	to	households	for	mortgages	and	to	SMEs,	which	unlike	big	firms	do	not	have	access	to	the	bond	
market.	 	 We	 have	 raised	 the	 important	 question	 whether	 regulatory	 capital	 requirements	 should	
penalize	 sectors	 like	 SMEs	 when	 clearly	 the	 credit	 risk	 conditions	 do	 not	 warrant	 this.	 	 Indeed,	 the	
complex	Basel	 II/III	 risk	weighted	 framework	has	been	 implicated	 for	 causing	perverse	 incentives	 and	
destabilizing	 capital	 arbitrage	 using	 the	 risk	weights	 both	 in	 the	 run	 up	 to	 2007	GFC,	Markose	 et.	 al.	
(2012)	and	in	the	case	of	the		Eurozone	crisis	(Acharya	and	Steffan,		2015).		
											Following	the	recent	BoE	agent	based	model	of	the	UK	mortgage	market,	Battista	et.	al.		(2017)	,	
our	data	driven	ACE	model	anchors	the	mortgage	eligibility	conditions	for	UK	households	to	those	based	
on	 their	 income	distribution,	 extant	 home	owner	 status	 and	 net	worth	 after	mortgage	 indebtedness.		
Likewise,	the	relevant	financial	balance	sheet	data	of	other	agent	classes	are	used	as	initial	conditions.	
An	important	empirical	scale	factor	is	used	to	determine	the	proportions	of	the	agents	in	the	different	
classes	to	simulate	the	UK	economy	and	to	produce	simulation	outputs	that	are	similar	in	value	to	actual	
macro-economic	 data.	 	 As	we	 saw	 this	 has	worked.	 	 Likewise,	 to	 focus	 on	 how	 the	 key	 bank	 lending	
decisions	 	we	recommend	how	ACE	models	should	embrace	the	embedding	of	an	endogenous	section	
within	a	 framework	of	 the	wider	economic	data	which	 is	 fed	exogenously	 to	 the	agents	as	 they	make	
their	decisions	at	each	time	step	within	the	simulator.	 	 	This	is	a	new	ingredient	to	ACE	modelling	that	
can	produce	quantitative	outputs	that	are	of	similar	magnitudes	as	actual	variables	and	produce	finely	
tuned	institutionally	rich	simulations	for	policy	analysis.			
Appendix A: Empirical Evidence on the UK Economy 	
The	UK	economy	data	around	the	launch	of	APP	in	2009	is	used	as	empirical	base	for	the	ACE	model.	
The	 Appendix	 includes	 relevant	 data	 that	 was	 used	 in	 the	 ACE	 model	 for	 the	 nonfinancial	 sectors	
(households	and	nonfinancial	businesses)	and	banks	in	the	UK.	
A.1  Households Income Distribution  
We	 simulate	 the	 income	 distribution	 for	 the	 100,000	model	 agents	 from	 the	 UK	 income	 distribution	
given	in	deciles	in	Figure	A.1.	According	to	Institute	for	Fiscal	Studies	(IFS)23,the	average	weekly	income	of	
a	household	in	the	2008-09	financial	year	was	£560.64	(an	equivalent	of	£2,429.43	per	month24)	with	50%	
of	the	households	making	£450.52	or	less	a	week	(or	£1,951.84	a	month).	For	purpose	of	modelling	HHs	
																																								 																				
23Institute	 for	 Fiscal	 Studies:	 	 Inequality	 and	 Poverty	 Spreadsheet	 which	 “provides	 data	 on	 British	 living	 standards,	
inequality	and	poverty”	available	at:	http://www.ifs.org.uk/tools_and_resources/incomes_in_uk.	
24	Monthly	income	=	Weekly	Income	x	52	(weeks	a	year)	/	12	(months	a	year).	
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mortgage	affordability	used	by	banks	as	a	lending	criterion,	we	calculate	the	monthly	equivalents	of	the	
weekly	income	data.		
FigureA.1:	The	Probability	Distribution	of	Household	Weekly	Income	(2008-09)	
	
																						Source:	Households	below	average	income	(HBAI):	1994/95	to	2008/09;	P15;	Department	for	Work	and	Pensions;	Available	at:	
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/households-below-average-income-hbai-199495-to-200809	
A.2 Housing and Mortgage Markets 
We	use	the	Nationwide	UK	house	price	 index	data25	 	and	ONS	home	ownership	and	renting	data26.		
The	latter	indicates	that	64%	of	homes	in	the	UK	are	owner-occupied	(the	remaining	36%	of	homes	are	
rented),	and	that	about	52%	of	the	homeowners	have	mortgage	obligations.	Some	salient	facts	here	are	
that	the	gross	amount	outstanding	of	mortgages	had	continuously	grown	from	£366.764	billion	in	1996	
Q1	to	peak	at	about	£854.718	billion	in	2008	Q2.	After	that,	it	fell	by	7.1%	(to	£801.393	billion)	during	the	
second	half	of	2008,	from	when	it	started	to	grow	again	to	reach	£1.111	trillion	in	2014	Q4.			
A3. Non-Performing Loans in the UK:Used to Calibrate Default Probability  
The	probability	of	default	is	proxied	by	the	ratio	of	loan	write-offs	to	the	total	amount	of	loans	for	
each	loan	type.	The	amounts	of	loan	write-offs	and	total	mortgages	and	business	loans	to	BFs	and	SMEs	
are	available	from	BoE.27	
Figure	A.3:	Quarterly	Loan	Write-offs	by	UK	Banks	by	Loan	Type		
																																								 																				
25http://www.nationwide.co.uk/about/house-price-index/download-data#xtab:uk-series.	
26http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/census/2011-census/detailed-characteristics-on-housing-for-local-authorities-in-
england-and-wales/short-story-on-detailed-characteristics.html.	
27The	quarterly	data	on	the	amounts	outstanding	of	business	loans	and	mortgages,	and	the	amounts	of	loan	write-
offs	on	the	two	loan	types	are	available	from	BoE’s	Interactive	Database.	
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																																																	Source:	Bank	of	England	(http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/iadb/newintermed.asp)	
A4. Top 10 UK Banks Equity to Total Assets Ratios 
Bank	 Date	 Equity	to	Total	Assets	Ratio	
HSBC	 31/12/2008	 2.05%	
Barclays	 31/12/2008	 2.12%	
Royal	Bank	of	Scotland	 31/12/2008	 2.65%	
Lloyds	 31/12/2008	 2.22%	
Standard	Chartered	 31/12/2008	 4.84%	
NatWest	 31/12/2008	 4.19%	
Santander	UK	 31/12/2013	 4.66%	
Nationwide	 31/12/2008	 3.36%	
The	Co-operative	Bank	 31/12/2008	 5.27%	
Clydesdale	and	Yorkshire	Bank	 31/12/2008	 4.85%	
Source:	Bankscope	Database	available	at	(http://www.bvdinfo.com)	
Figure	A.	5:	The	Initial	Values/Distributions	of	the	Model’s	Variables		
Variable	 Value/Distribution	 Assumptions/Empirical	facts	
Households	 	 	
Number	of	households	 10,000	 Scaled	down	from	21,464,730	
Number	of	houses	per	household	
Number	 0	 1	 2	 3	 4	 Only	64%	of	UK	households	own	at	least	
one	property	Probability	 0.36	 0.16	 0.16	 0.16	 0.16	
House	price	 £149,400	 Average	house	price	in	2009	Q1.	
Household	housing	wealth	 Number	of	Houses	x	House	price	 	
Household	cash	 Uniformly	distributed	between	£5,000	and	£50,000	 	
Household	mortgage	liability	 Uniformly	distributed	between	£0	and	£70,965	
-	52%	of	the	homeowners	have	mortgages	
-	HHs	average	mortgage	liability	in	2009	Q1	
was	£49,070	
Household	equity	 Household	housing	wealth	+	household	cash	-	household	 	
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mortgage	liability	
Household	income	 Log-normally	distributed	
The	distribution	is	estimated	using	the	
monthly	equivalents	of	IFS’s	parameters	of	
the	weekly	income	distribution	(in	2009	Q1)	
Household	preferred	bank	 Randomly	selected	 	
Big	Firms	 	 	
Number	of	big	firms	 30	 Scaled	down	from	4,405	
Big	firm	Physical	capital	 Uniformly	distributed	between	£5	million	and	£300	million	 	
Big	firm	cash	 (0.1283/0.8717)	x	physical	capital	
cash	represented	12.83%	of	nonfinancial	
firms’	total	assets	in	2009	Q1	
Big	firm	debt	to	total	assets	ratio	 51.66%	
NFCs	debt	to	total	assets	ratio	in	2009	Q1	
was	51.66%	
Big	firm	loans	 34.77%	x	(physical	capital	+	cash)	
Loans	represented	67.3%	of	NFCs	total	debt	
in	2009	Q1.	(67.3%	x	51.66%	=	34.77%)	
Big	firm	bonds	 16.89%	x	(physical	capital	+	cash)	
Bonds	represented	32.7%	of	NFCs	total	debt	
in	2009	Q1.	(32.7%	x	51.66%	=	16.89%)	
Big	firm	equity	
Big	firm	physical	capital	+	big	firm	cash	-	big	firm	loans	-	big	
firms	bond	
	
Big	firm	preferred	bank	 Randomly	selected	 	
Small	and	medium	enterprises	 	 	
Number	of	SMEs	 2,290	 Scaled	down	from	4,918,915	
SME	Physical	capital	 Uniformly	distributed	between	£50,000	and	£1	million	 	
SME	cash	 (0.1283/0.8717)	x	physical	capital	
cash	represented	12.83%	of	nonfinancial	
firms’	total	assets	in	2009	Q1	
SME	debt	to	total	assets	ratio	 40%	
SMEs	are	less	able	to	use	debt	financing	
compared	to	BFs	
SME	loans	 40%	x	(physical	capital	+	cash)	 	
SME	equity	 SME	physical	capital	+	SME	cash	-	SME	loans	 	
SME	preferred	bank	 Randomly	selected	 	
Banks	 	 	
Number	of	banks	 10	 	
Bank	total	mortgages	 Sum	of	mortgages	of	HHs	that	deal	with	the	bank	 	
Bank	loans	to	big	firms	 Sum	of	loans	to	big	firms	that	deal	with	the	bank	 	
Bank	loans	to	SMEs	 Sum	of	loans	to	SMEs	that	deal	with	the	bank	 	
Bank	deposits	
Sum	of	cash	of	households,	big	firms	and	SMEs	that	deal	
with	the	bank	
	
Bank	equity	 Mortgages	+	loans	to	big	firms	+	loans	to	SMEs	–	deposits	 	
Interest	rates	 	 	
Risk-free	rate	(rRF)	 0.5%	 BoE	policy	rate	
Government	gilts	rate	(rG)	 4%	 Median	yield	on	10-year	gilts	in	2008	Q4	
Interest	rate	on	BFs	bonds	 6%	 rG	+	2%	
Interest	rate	on	BFs	loans	 5.5%	 rRF	+	5%	
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Interest	rate	on	mortgages	 7%	 rRF	+	6.5%	
Interest	rate	on	SMEs	loans	 8.5%	 rRF	+	8%	
Risk	Weights	 	 	
BFs	loans	risk	weight	 0.2	 	
Mortgages	risk	weight	 0.5	 	
SMEs	loans	risk	weight	 1.0	 	
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